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ABSTRACT 
Behavioral Components of the Utility 
of Gambling (February, 1971) 
xii 
George W. Sheldon, University of Massachusetts 
M.B.A., University of Massachusetts 
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts 
Directed by: Dr. Meyer W. Belovicz 
In the past, laboratory attempts to measure the utility 
of tangible goods, using gambling experiments, have been 
confounded by behavioral factors underlying the gambling pro¬ 
cess, including the utility of the gamble itself. No attempts 
have been made to measure the ut-ility of gambling. 
The purpose of this study is to delineate, define, and 
provide measurement of some of the behavioral factors re¬ 
lated to the utility of gambling, as a first step in the mea¬ 
surement process. Specifically, it considers two primary 
variables: (1) confidence in winning and (2) variability. 
Variability is the potential upward change in asset position 
resulting from the gamble, which is directly controlled by 
the individual. It can be increased by: (1) increasing the 
amount wagered, and (2) increasing the proportion of gambles 
which yield a lower probability of success and higher pay¬ 
offs. 
These primary variables were tested in a real world 
setting, a thoroughbred horse race track. Hypotheses in- 
Xlll 
volving variability were tested using aggregate data ob¬ 
tained by an empirical investigation and individual data 
obtained by questionnaire. Hypotheses involving confidence 
in winning were tested using data derived by personal inter¬ 
view. The two primary variables were related, in the stated 
hypotheses, to other variables, including: (1) time, (2) 
the pattern of prior successes and failures, (3) satisfac¬ 
tion with the gambling process and its outcomes, (4) indi¬ 
vidual experience in gambling, and (5) effects of group pres¬ 
sure on the individual. The hypotheses were based on estab¬ 
lished behavioral models, viable behavioral theory, and con¬ 
jectures and observations resulting from previous experimen¬ 
tation . 
The major conclusions are as follows: 
(1) In the aggregate, bettors increase the amount 
wagered and the proportion of gambles yielding 
a relatively high probability of success as 
the racing program progresses. 
(2) A major subgroup of bettors (Clubhouse atten¬ 
dees) increase the amount wagered but decrease 
the proportion of gambles yielding a relatively 
high probability of success as the racing pro¬ 
gram progresses, showing that betting behavior 
varies among subgroups of the population. 
Winners of their previous race increase the (3) 
XIV 
amount wagered more than do losers. Losers 
who remained above the break-even point in¬ 
crease their wagers more than do losers who 
remained below the break-even point, who, in 
turn, increase the amount wagered more than 
do losers who fell through the break-even 
point on their previous race. 
(4) Winners of their previous race increase the 
proportion of bets yielding a relatively 
high probability of success less than do 
losers. Losers who remained below the break¬ 
even point increase this'proportion at a 
greater rate than do losers who remained 
above the break-even point, who, in turn, 
increase this proportion more than do losers 
who fell below the break-even point on that 
previous race. 
(5) Individuals who are losing just prior to their 
last wager bet that race in a manner which en¬ 
ables them to at least break even overall if 
they win. 
(6) Veteran race fans bet fewer races than do neo¬ 
phytes . 
(7) In explaining the degree of satisfaction de¬ 
rived from the racing event, the amount of 
money won is an important factor, while the 
proportion of tickets collected is not. 
Individuals who attend the races as members 
of informal or family groups increase the 
amount wagered and the proportion of gambles 
yielding a higher probability of success less 
than do individuals who attend alone. 
Confidence in winning remains relatively con¬ 
stant from just prior to placement of the bet 
until the race is underway. 
Confidence in winning is highest for winners 
of their previous race and winners overall, 
lower for losers of their previous race who 
are winning overall, lower yet for winners of 
their previous race who are losing overall, 
and lowest for losers of their previous race 
who are losing overall. 
» 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This study consists of an investigation of the behav¬ 
ioral components of the utility of gambling. Although 
many variables contribute to such a utility, only two se¬ 
lect variables, one involving the potential wealth result¬ 
ing from gambling and a second involving.the confidence in 
winning possessed by individuals, are specifically con¬ 
sidered. These two measurable variables are investigated 
under a variety of conditions, these being functions of 
time, immediate or overall winnings or losses, or varia¬ 
tions in the personal attributes of the individuals them¬ 
selves. The purpose of the study is twofold: (1) to de¬ 
lineate, measure, and investigate relationships which con¬ 
tribute to the utility of gambling, and (2) to correlate 
these findings with established behavioral, mathematical, 
and economic theory. It is hoped that the results of this 
investigation will provide a stepping stone for the future 
development of utility theory and will stimulate further 
research in the area. 
This chapter consists of eleven sections: (1) a 
statement concerning the basic problem associated with 
utility theory, (2) a statement of the specific purpose of 
this study, (3) a short review of utility theory, (4) ap¬ 
plications of Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility theory, (5) 
a review of some classical utility experiments, (6) an ex¬ 
position of some problems associated with the utility of 
gambling, (7) a brief review of the theory of cognitive 
dissonance, (8) a statement about the relationship between 
utility theory and the theory of cognitive dissonance, (9) 
a review of research particularly relevant to this study, 
(10) a discussion of advantages and disadvantages of field 
studies and laboratory experiments, and (11) an exposition 
of the race track as an example of a field experimental 
setting. 
The Utility Problem 
' i 
In 1944, John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern 
showed, for the first time, that, provided that individual 
2 
behavior conforms to a set of "highly reasonable" axioms, 
a measurable utility index can be constructed. This index, 
derived from either observed choices or stated preferences 
among prizes, was measurable only in the sense that the nu¬ 
merical operations used in the construction of the index 
were logically equivalent to individual behavior and were 
consequently empirically interpretable. 
The mathematical proofs in their work provided a logi¬ 
cal basis for departure from the classical cardinal and the 
3 
neoclassical ordinal utility theories which preceded 
their work and had dominated economic thought prior to that 
3 
time. 
During the late 1950's, and primarily the result of 
the publication and widespread acceptance of Luce and 
4 
Raiffa's popular and understandable exposition of the Von 
Neumann-Morgenstern theory, the new measurable utility in¬ 
dex was incorporated into new quantitative decision-making 
tools, which were, in principle, useful at the practical 
level under conditions of certainty, risk, and uncertainty. 
In particular, the utility index had aided the development 
of Game Theory and Bayesian Decision Theory, since the mea¬ 
sured utility of tangible prizes in many cases constituted 
the basic payoffs used in these models. These decision¬ 
making techniques have gained widespread theoretical accep¬ 
tance but, on a practical level, use has been limited. 
This has primarily been a result of the inability to mea¬ 
sure the utility of goods in any practical sense. In es¬ 
sence, these techniques raised questions concerning the use 
of utility theory which had not been encountered in previ¬ 
ous applications. 
The basis for computation of a Von Neumann-Morgenstern 
5 
utility index is the determination of a point of indiffer¬ 
ence between a particular reference prize and a lottery 
consisting of a probabilistic receipt of two more extreme 
prizes. When the individual is indifferent between this 
reference prize and the lottery, the probability associated 
4 
with the most preferred extreme prize of this lottery be¬ 
comes the utility index of the reference prize. 
Since the construction of the utility index involves 
the use of lotteries, it was natural that laboratory at¬ 
tempts at verification involved observation of individuals 
under gambling conditions. Such tests were conducted, with 
results suggesting that the utility model worked well for 
some individuals, while failing for others. The reason for 
failure was that the utility of tangible goods was con¬ 
founded by the behavioral aspects of the gambles involved 
and, in particular, by the utility of the gamble itself. 
The Von Neumann-Morgenstern model not only provided no 
methodology for the measurement of these intangibles, but 
it specifically assumes that there is no utility to gam¬ 
bling. 
It becomes apparent, in view of the preceding discus¬ 
sion, that the long run problem becomes one of devising 
methodology for the measurement of utility at the practical 
level, thus providing a basis for the use of quantitative 
decision-making tools at that level. In addition to the 
need for the measurement of utility for individuals, this 
would include the definition and measurement of aggregate 
utility, or welfare. 
A more immediate problem is to provide methodology for 
the separation and measurement of the utility of intangible 
5 
attributes of tangible prizes. Specifically, this includes 
the isolation and measurement of the utility of gambling, 
since this comprises a basic attribute of the decision¬ 
making process. It is this problem which underlies the 
purpose of this study. 
Purpose 
The purpose of this study is to investigate, identify, 
and derive estimates of the magnitude of the behavioral as¬ 
pects which constitute the utility of gambling. 
It should be obvious that many different attributes 
contribute to this utility. Consequently, this study is 
not exhaustive. Actually, only two variables are consid¬ 
ered in this study. These are: (1) variability and (2) 
confidence in winning. Variability refers to changes in 
the asset position of individuals and provides insight in¬ 
to the utility of gambling which results from changes in 
the wealth position of individuals. Confidence in winning 
reflects some non-material aspects of the gamble and pro¬ 
vides a basis for the investigation of the utility derived 
from these attributes. 
The stated hypotheses are designed to highlight, mea¬ 
sure, and partially determine behavioral effects related to 
these two variables. Specifically, some of the hypotheses 
reflect changes in variability which vary as a function of 
6 
time, overall or immediate winnings or losses, or attri¬ 
butes of individuals participating in the gambles. These 
attributes reflect either the maturity of the individual 
as a gambler or his attendance status. Other hypotheses 
test either the absolute or relative degree of confidence 
in winning, this being a function of either time or the 
amounts and patterns of previous winnings or losses. 
Hopefully, the results of this preliminary work will 
promote a new understanding of the basic problem and will 
serve as a stepping stone to subsequent research in the 
general area. 
Utility Theory 
Ownership or control of goods and services implies 
that these goods and services have value. Either they can 
be exchanged for other goods and services or they can be 
utilized directly in the satisfaction of individual needs. 
This value may be, in the case of an asset, positive, or, 
in the case of a liability, negative. It is an attribute 
of a good or service and is called utility, implying that 
value is attainable through use or ownership. 
Economists, who deal directly with the exchange of 
goods and services, have incorporated the concept of util¬ 
ity into the basic vocabulary of their discipline, even 
though its meaning has varied over time and among individ- 
7 
uals. The concept of utility is fundamental to the dis- 
g 
cipline. Daniel Bernoulli, as early as 1732, in his so¬ 
lution of the famous St. Petersburg Paradox, depended upon 
the utility concept, it being a necessary part of his solu¬ 
tion. 
Over the course of time, as the study of economics 
matured, it became necessary to develop a measurable util¬ 
ity model. Several of these models were forthcoming, the 
earliest being the cardinal utility model, and its varia- 
7 
tions, advanced by Jevons, Menger, walras, and Marshall. 
Cardinal Utility Theory 
In the cardinal model, utility is measurable, accord- 
o 
ing to Jevons, in the sense that, if an individual is able 
to compare prizes, rank them as to order of preference, and 
is transitive among this order, the utility index of some 
other prize, for example: a sum of money, can be deter¬ 
mined. This is done by finding the sum of money for which 
his preference for a more preferred prize over that sum is 
just equal to his preference for that sum over a less pre¬ 
ferred prize. The utility index for that sum is equal to 
one half of the sum of the utilities of the other two 
prizes. It is measurable, or cardinal on an interval scale, 
in that this utility index for the intermediate prize is 
unique up to a linear transformation, it depending only on 
the utility values placed on the two reference prizes. The 
8 
essence of the model was that the utility curve for any 
individual could be determined by asking him to express 
his preferences among goods. 
Ordinal Utility Theory 
Edgeworth first introduced the use of indifference 
9 
curves in 1881. Indifference curves are iso-utility 
curves, constructed in such a manner that total utility re¬ 
mains constant for any mixture of goods represented by a 
point on the curve.^ Higher curves represent combinations 
of goods preferred to combinations represented by lower 
curves. These preferences are ordinal and, as such, mean 
that utility is not measurable in the same sense as cardi- 
nal utility. 
Economic indifference analysis requires only that an 
individual be able to state his preference among goods, re¬ 
main transitive over these preferences, and prefer more to 
less. It is not necessary for the individual to state how 
much he prefers one to the other, only that he either has 
a preference or is indifferent between them. Indifference 
analysis assumes that goods are infinitely divisible and 
can be substituted for one another. 
11 12 
Slutsky, and later both Hicks and Allen, were able 
to show that indifference analysis could supply all of the 
major conclusions provided by the older cardinal model with¬ 
out making it necessary to meet the stronger assumptions 
9 
necessary for the cardinal model. The demise of the cardi¬ 
nal model soon followed. 
Von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility Theory 
The latest utility model, which underlies modern util- 
13 
ity. theory, was presented by Von Neumann and Morgenstern 
14 
in 1947, and popularized by Luce and Raiffa in 1957. The 
neoclassical model, meaningful only under conditions of 
certainty, was satisfactory for most economic situations, 
but was not suitable for conditions of risk. Risk is a 
characteristic of real-world decision-making. 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern asserted that the notion 
15 
of maximization of expected utility, basic to modern de¬ 
cision-making techniques, would be made more meaningful if 
utility were defined in a special way, and, if so done, 
could be used successfully in the solution of a wide range 
of problems under risk. They noted that, if an individ¬ 
ual's preferences among prospects, described in an ordinal 
manner, were to satisfy a set of highly reasonable axioms, 
it is then possible to express utility in this special way, 
as a numerical value, unique up to a linear transformation. 
Utility was measurable in the sense that it could be ex¬ 
pressed by a number, but was ordinal in the ordering of 
preferences. It was, in essence, a hybrid of the classical 
and neoclassical models. The essence of the Von Neumann- 
Morgenstern work was to offer mathematical proof that the 
utility index could be so constructed, given that an indi- 
10 
vidual's behavior conformed to the set of axioms. 
The set of axioms for the Von Neumann-Morgenstern 
16 
utility model are: (1) an individual must be able to 
list a set of prizes used as a reference, can indicate his 
preferences among them, and must be transitive in these 
preferences, (2) a compound lottery (in which one or more 
prizes are lotteries themselves) can be reduced to a sim¬ 
ple lottery by use of ordinary probability theory, (3) each 
simple lottery is equivalent to a reduced lottery involving 
only the most preferred and least preferred prizes, (4) 
this reduced lottery is substitutable for any simple or 
compound lottery, (5) preference or indifference among lot¬ 
teries is transitive, and (6) one lottery, with a probabil¬ 
ity p^ of receiving prize A and 1-p^ °f receiving a second 
prize B, is preferred to or indifferent to a second lottery 
with probability p2 of receiving A and l-p2 °f receiving B, 
only if _> p2. 
The index itself can be determined either by observa¬ 
tion of the behavior of individuals, or by interrogation of 
individual preferences among proposed lotteries. 
Applications of Von Neumann-Morgenstern Theory 
Economists still rely heavily upon the neoclassical or¬ 
dinal utility theory. Text book theory is still developed 
17 
primarily in terms of indifference analysis. The appli- 
11 
cations area consists of solutions to real world problems 
of firms and individuals using modern management tools such 
as mathematical programming, Bayesian decision theory, sim¬ 
ulation and game theory. Economists presently view the ap¬ 
plications area as being fruitful and have consequently 
turned to the Von Neumann-Morgenstern theory. 
When the above techniques are applied to problems in 
which payoffs cover a relatively narrow range of wealth, it 
is appropriate, and often done, to consider monetary re¬ 
ceipts and expenditures as payoff values. If, however, pay 
offs represent a wider range of wealth, wide enough for 
changing marginal utility of money to become an important 
factor, it is more meaningful to use utility for payoff 
values. This is particularly true in Bayesian decision 
theory. As for game theory, the theory itself calls for 
payoffs expressed on an interval scale, which the Von Neu¬ 
mann-Morgenstern utility index satisfies. The Von Neumann- 
Morgenstern utility theory underlies or can be meaningful 
to most Management Science decision-making techniques. 
Possibly the most important application of the modern 
theory lies in its future applications. To date, most Be¬ 
havioral Science models have been descriptive models. Game 
theory, being a model of logic, has the potential of becom¬ 
ing the most important model of the behavioral sciences. It 
is not a theoretic model in itself, but merely a new form 
of applied mathematics which lends itself particularly well 
12 
to problems involving rational choice. It possesses the 
potential of becoming the basis for the analysis and ex- 
planation of individual behavior. In its present form, 
it is not able to accomplish this, but even now it points 
up the inadequacies of the current behavioral models and 
underscores the complexity of human behavior. 
Experimental Measurement of Utility 
Classical Utility Experimentation 
At the time of popularity of the cardinal utility the¬ 
ory, very little experimentation was accomplished by econo¬ 
mists. It was generally believed that the amount of goods 
purchased was a decreasing function of price. Since the 
cardinal utility theory was not used for any other purpose, 
it was not believed necessary to put the theory to actual 
tests, although it was generally assumed that the theory was 
20 
empirically testable. 
Ordinal Utility Experimentation 
The ordinal utility theory of Slutsky, Hicks and Allen, 
which replaced the classical cardinal theory, was tested in 
21 
the laboratory three times. In the first test, Thurstone, 
for a single individual, derived a set of indifference curves 
between a control good and two other reference goods. He 
then used these curves to predict preferences among the ref¬ 
erence goods and compared these predictions to the set of 
I 
13 
curves derived in the laboratory. His experiment was con¬ 
sidered to be a success, since his predictions were rela¬ 
tively consistent with the derived preferences. The basic 
criticism of his experiment was that imaginary goods were 
used and that only one individual was tested. Rousseas 
22 
and Hart conducted a laboratory experiment which showed 
that indifferent curves similar to those of Thurstone could 
be constructed for groups of individuals, using aggregate 
23 
data. Coombs and Milholland tried to show that such mea¬ 
surements were applicable to risky decisions, which dif¬ 
fered from the riskless situation of Thurstone, but they 
were unable to confirm such findings. The basic finding 
of these three experiments was that indifferent curves were 
convex to the origin, as the theory dictated. 
Von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility Experimentation 
The first, and most prominent of the Von Neumann- 
Morgenstern experiments was conducted by Mosteller and 
24 
Nogee. Two different groups were observed responding to 
a variety of rolls of poker dice by making bets using real 
money. In this way, an indifference point was established 
for each prestated roll of the dice and the willingness of 
the subject to bet on that roll. The utility of $0.00 and 
-$.05 were arbitrarily set at 0 and -1 respectively. The 
derivation of a set of indifference curves for the players 
was accomplished, some of these curves exhibiting diminish- 
I 
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ing marginal utility of money, others not. These curves 
were used to predict results for more complex bets. These 
were of moderate success, with some individuals seemingly 
maximizing expected utility and others seemingly maximiz¬ 
ing expected monetary rewards. A major criticism of this 
work was that subjects were paid as the experiment evolved 
and the consequential changing wealth level could upset the 
results. 
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Edwards later conducted a series of experiments from 
which he was able to conclude that individuals prefer some 
probabilities to others. He also stated that these prefer¬ 
ences cannot be accounted for by utility considerations 
alone. This finding indicated that the Von Neumann-Morgen- 
stern utility measurement contained a major flaw, since 
preference among lotteries was a function of both probabil¬ 
ity and utility, not just utility alone. This led to the 
conjoint problem, the problem of measuring utility and prob¬ 
ability simultaneously and later breaking out the two com- 
26 27 
ponents. Coombs and Beardslee and Coombs and Milholland 
conducted experiments of this sort, but their results were 
2 8 29 
only partially successful. Later, Marks and Irwin found 
evidence that utility and subjective probability were func¬ 
tions of each other. This added another complication to the 
conjoint problem, since, if this is true, the two measures 
are not independent and the exact relationship between them 
15 
must be determined before the utility component can be 
broken out of the conjoint measurement. 
The principal results of these experiments was to un¬ 
derscore the complexity of the situation and to indicate 
that the behavioral implications are great. Even given 
the ability to solve the conjoint problem, it was shown 
that individuals vary greatly in their utility and proba¬ 
bility preferences. An even more difficult problem was the 
existence of the utility of the gamble itself, a factor 
which further complicates the results of laboratory find¬ 
ings. The success of the Von Neumann-Morgenstern labora¬ 
tory experiments was, at best, marginal. 
The Utility of Gambling 
The Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility theory, in actu¬ 
ality, provides for the measurement of the total utility 
associated with all aspects of the lotteries used in its 
30 
methodology. Luce and Raiffa report: 
"the utility function so constructed re¬ 
flects preferences about the alternatives in a 
certain given situation, and so it will reflect 
not only how the subject feels about the alter¬ 
natives (prizes, outcomes, or stimuli) in the 
abstract, but how he feels about them in the 
particular situation. For example, the result¬ 
ing function will incorporate his attitude 
towards the whole gambling situation." 
No attempts have been made to separate utility of the 
gamble from the utility of the prizes. Since the utility 
16 
measurement needed for modern decision-making techniques 
requires the utility of the payoffs alone, some method must 
be discovered which will separate the utility of the gamble 
from the utility of the prize. The Von Neumann-Morgenstern 
theory is not directly useful for these purposes until this 
is done. 
The Theory of Cognitive Dissonance 
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Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance is the 
most prominent in a series of theories of cognitive consis- 
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tency, which basically assert that individual behavior is 
a function of how an individual perceives his environment, 
his actions being consistent with these perceptions. 
Festinger's theory has direct implications for the specific 
situations of: (1) forced compliance, (2) the acceptance 
of the willingful exposure to new information, (3) social ac 
ceptance of and social support for individuals, and (4) in¬ 
dividual decision-making. It differs primarily from other 
consistency theories in that it "places unique emphasis on 
33 
the consequences of decisions." This emphasis is of par¬ 
ticular interest to this study. 
The basis of the theory is that the finest grained per¬ 
ceptions of individuals, which Festinger calls cognitive el¬ 
ements, can be either irrelevant, consonant, or dissonant, 
being irrelevant if they have nothing to do with each other, 
17 
consonant if one element is consistent with another, and 
dissonant if "one element follows from the obverse of the 
34 
other." The basic attributes of cognitions lead to the 
two central hypotheses of the theory: (1) "the presence 
of dissonance gives rise to pressures to reduce that dis- 
35 
sonance," and (2) "the strength of the pressure to re¬ 
duce dissonance is a function of the magnitude of the ex- 
3 6 
isting dissonance." * 
Assuming that individuals do attempt to reduce the 
dissonance which exists among their perceptions, Festinger 
lists three ways in which this reduction can take place: 
(1) "by changing one or more of the elements involved in 
the dissonant relations," (2) "by adding new cognitive ele¬ 
ments which are consistent with already existing cogni¬ 
tions," and (3) "by decreasing the importance of the ele- 
37 
ments involved in the dissonant relations." 
Festinger notes that, although dissonance always re¬ 
sults from a choice among alternatives in the decision pro¬ 
cess, the overt expression of the dissonance reduction pro¬ 
cess varies from person to person. "For some people, dis¬ 
sonance is an extremely painful and intolerable thing, while 
there are others who seem to be able to tolerate a large 
38 
amount of dissonance." This accounts for the large vari¬ 
ance in the observed intensity of the dissonance reduction 
process, which in turn can upset experimental results. 
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The original theory, as presented by Festinger in 
1957, created considerable interest among social psychol¬ 
ogists and, consequently, provided the basis for consider¬ 
able research. This research took the form of laboratory 
39 
experiments which, by and large, confirmed the theory. 
Not only did experimental data fit the theory well, but the 
theory was able to predict experimental outcomes in most 
cases, with very few outright disconfirmations of the the¬ 
ory resulting. However, several modifications and refine¬ 
ments of the original theory were the result of this flurry 
of laboratory experiments. 
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Brehm and Cohen are responsible for the two major 
modifications of the theory, which involved the concepts of 
commitment and volition. They suggested that commitment 
may be a unique aspect of dissonance theory. "What gives 
particular psychological meaning to one element following 
41 
from another or its obverse is commitment." This modifi- 
42 
cation was later accepted by Festinger. 
Brehm and Cohen also stated that the individual is not 
likely to experience dissonance if he does not believe that 
he made the choice between alternatives himself, or acted 
voluntarily. "It may be that volition is implicit in any 
4 3 
situation of unequivical dissonance arousal." Thus their 
claim, "if an individual voluntarily gets himself into a 
set of circumstances, is committed, and this produces in- 
19 
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congruities, the individual will experience dissonance."* 
These two changes represent the major modifications of the 
- • * 
theory to date. 
Festinger later contributed two minor modifications to 
his original theory. He claims, as a result of his later 
experimentation, that the predecisicn activity had at least 
some effect on the postdecision dissonance, probably reduc- 
45 
ing it. He was unclear as to just what this effect would 
be. He also claimed that, immediately following the deci¬ 
sion, but before the dissonance reduction process takes 
effect, the individual experiences a period of regret.^0 
Thus dissonance and regret occur simultaneously. 
Aronson^ later modified the original theory in two 
ways. His first claim actually only supported a statement 
made by Festinger in his earlier wTork, when he indicated 
that some people could tolerate dissonance better than 
others. Aronson qualified this by stating that, for some 
individuals who were especially able to tolerate disso¬ 
nance, the dissonance reduction process may never take 
place. He also claimed that Festinger had misplaced the 
48 . 
actual source of dissonance. He suggested that it is not 
the incongruity between any two elements that actually pro¬ 
duce the dissonance, but an incongruity between elements 
and a self-belief or self-expectancy which causes the disso¬ 
nance . 
I 
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No other important modifications have occurred. Al¬ 
though some of the experimental results have been ques- 
49 
tioned and criticized, the theory has been confirmed by 
most of the experiments and is recognized as a viable the¬ 
ory by most social psychologists. 
The Relationship Between Dissonance Theory 
and Utility Theory 
Two seemingly incompatible types of theories are evi¬ 
dent in modern social psychological thought. The most 
popular are the theories of cognitive consistency, of which 
Festinger's theory of cognitive dissonance is the most prom¬ 
inent. The basic theme of these theories is that incongrui¬ 
ties among cognitions 'are unpleasant or painful, and that 
human behavior is the result of individual efforts to re¬ 
duce these incongruities, thus making life more pleasant 
for the individual. The second, just as viable as the first 
but not as widely accepted, are the theories supporting the 
50 
pursuit of inconsistency, or variety. These theories sug¬ 
gest that inconsistency is desirable and that the individual 
behavior is the result of purposeful pursuit of variety, 
thus enabling the individual to escape boredom and provide 
variety in life, which he desires. Proponents of these 
theories suggest that the pursuit of variety underlies the 
the basic learning process and is essential to progress in 
learning. 
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Maddi, the leading proponent of the variety theories, 
claims that individuals maintain an equilibrium between 
consistency and inconsistency, and that, depending upon 
the circumstances, can exhibit behavior corresponding to 
51 
either theory. Thus he argues in favor of both seeming¬ 
ly contradictory theories, refuting neither. This type of 
thinking is not new to economists, since they often argue 
for a trade off between two or more variables as decision 
criteria. An example of such a trade off is the argument 
52 
in favor of a quadratic utility function. 
As was previously indicated, this study is concerned 
primarily with two variables, variability and confidence 
in winning. Seemingly, there is little in common between 
these two variables but, in viev; of the previous discus¬ 
sion, and in view of the exact definitions of the varia¬ 
bles as they appear in Chapter II, it is evident that both 
are useful in explaining the utility of gambling. The var¬ 
iability hypotheses directly test for behavioral patterns 
resulting from the satisfaction derived from gambling. 
This satisfaction is the direct result of the purposeful 
seeking of variety, and the behavior is conducive to the 
theories of inconsistency. On the other hand, the hypoth¬ 
eses concerning the confidence in winning constitute di¬ 
rect measurement of cognitive dissonance, increases in 
confidence being the direct result of the dissonance re- 
22 
duction process. Behavior under these hypotheses is con¬ 
sistent with the consistency theories/ and contributes di¬ 
rectly to the understanding of the satisfaction, and hence 
the utility, derived from gambling. Both variables, seem¬ 
ingly incompatible on the surface, contribute, in a com¬ 
patible way, to the understanding of the behavioral as¬ 
pects of gambling. 
The Griffith, McGlothlin, Scott, 
and Knox and Inkster Studies 
Although the hypotheses in this study are derived from 
many different sources, four specific studies contribute 
directly to the formulation of some of them. The Griffith 
and McGlothlin studies underlie some of the variability hy¬ 
potheses, the Knox and Inkster study underlie some of the 
confidence hypotheses, and the Scott work contributes to 
both types. Consequently, these studies warrant separate 
discussion because of the direct impact they have on the 
current work. 
The Griffith Study53 
This study provided an analysis of 1386 thoroughbred 
horse races run in 1947. The principal findings were: (1) 
aggregate odds, as determined by the betting public, re¬ 
flect, on the whole, the true chances that a horse will 
win, (2) the betting public systematically overbets long 
odded horses and underbets short odded horses. 
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This study provided the first evidence that the pub¬ 
lic was, in the aggregate, able to correctly handicap 
horses. The second finding agreed with previous work by 
54 
Preston and Baratta. Griffith found a systematic over- 
estimation of low probabilities (long odds) and an under¬ 
estimation of high probabilities (short odds). The trans- 
ition point was a probability of .16 (.18 in a replication 
of the study), which was consistent with the Preston and 
Baratta findings. Subsequent testing has supported these 
55 
findings both within and outside the confines of gam“ 
bling. 
The McGlothlin Study^ 
This study provided an analysis of 9605 thoroughbred 
horse races run in the 1947-1953 period. Its purpose was 
to "examine the stability of risk-taking behavior over a 
57 
series of events." The important findings are listed 
below. 
(1) Bettors systematically overbet long odded horses 
(horses with a low probability of winning) and underbet 
short odded horses. The transition point fell in the 
.15-.22 interval, which agreed with previous findings. 
(2) The above finding applied not only to all races 
taken together, but to the individual races except the 
feature race and the final race of the race program. A 
discussion of these two races appears below. 
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The feature race. In this race, the favorite horses 
receive more publicity in the local press than do any other 
horses in the entire program. McGlothlin found that 
horses odded at 3/1 or less were accurately handicapped by 
the public, which is consistent with the proper utilization 
of the additional information available to the public. 
Horses odded between 4/1 and 7/1 were grossly underbet, 
while horses odded greater than 8/1 were grossly overbet. 
Horses odded at 7/1 were especially underbet. 
The last race. In this race, horses odded at 3/1 or 
less were grossly underbet, even to the point that, in the 
long run, if an individual always bet low odded horses in 
the last race, his winnings would more than offset the 
track take, thus providing a sure way to win at the race 
track. Horses odded in the 3.5/1 to 5.5/1 interval were 
overbet, with higher odded horses being bet accurately. 
(3) The amount bet per person per race program is 
highly skewed to the right. The average amount bet per 
person per program increases slightly as the racing meet 
progresses. 
(4) A linear increase in the amount bet per person 
per race is evident over the first seven races, with about 
eighty percent more money bet on the seventh race relative 
to the first race. The amount bet on the last race is 
slightly below that of the feature race. 
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(5) The proportion of win tickets purchased increased 
significantly as the race program progressed, the propor¬ 
tion of place tickets purchased decreased slightly, while 
the proportion of show tickets purchased decreased signif¬ 
icantly. 
(6) Bettors increase the amount bet more after having 
lost than after having won. 
The above conclusions were derived strictly from ag¬ 
gregate betting statistics and cannot be extended to indi¬ 
vidual betting behavior. 
c o 
The Scott Study 
Scott is a sociologist who grew up in a racing atmos¬ 
phere. His work was not experimental. His ideas were not 
tested, but were based on direct observation. They con¬ 
tributed directly to this study, and are cited when used. 
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The Knox and Inkster Study • 
The dissonance hypotheses in the current study both 
replicate and extend the work of Knox and Inkster. A des¬ 
cription of their study appears below. 
In this real world experiment, two experimenters were 
posted immediately in front of the two dollar Win windows 
at a horse track. One interviewed bettors as they ap¬ 
proached the windows, the second interviewed bettors as 
they left. Subjects were shown a scale prepared on eight 
and one-half by eleven inch cardboard, entitled "Chance to 
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Win". A copy of this scale is shown in Figure 1. Their 
responses were verbal numbers indicating that number which 
best corresponded to their estimate of the chance that the 
horse they were about to bet (had just bet) would win. 
Sixty-nine subjects were in the pre-bet group, while sev¬ 
enty-two were in the post-bet group. 
The experiment was conducted a second time, with forty- 
eight subjects in the pre-bet group and forty-six in the 
post-bet group. In this replication, the scale was a con¬ 
tinuous, twenty-three centimeter scale marked "No Confi¬ 
dence" at one end and "Complete Confidence" at the other. 
Subjects responded by drawing a line across the scale at 
the point which best corresponded to the confidence they 
had that the horse they were about to bet (had just bet) 
would win. A copy of this second scale is shown in Figure 
2. 
Under both experiments, subjects showed increased 
confidence in winning under the post-bet condition, rela¬ 
tive to the pre-bet condition. This increase was statis¬ 
tically significant in both cases, and provided strong 
support for Festinger's theory’, which predicted that, upon 
commitment, the dissonance reduction process would result 
in greater confidence in the selected alternative. The 
study showed, for the first time, that the dissonance re¬ 
duction process can take place in an extremely short length 
of time. 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Slight Fair Good Excellent 
Figure 1. Confidence Scale used by Knox 
and Inkster. 
No Confidence Complete Confidence 
r 
Figure 2. Confidence Scale used by Knox 
and Inkster—Replication. 
I 
28 
Comparison of Laboratory Experiments 
~with Field Experiments^ 
To test a given problem, either a controlled labora¬ 
tory experiment or a field experiment can be used. Since 
either of these techniques can provide meaningful tests of 
hypotheses, a choice must be made among them. This choice 
depends on several factors. 
Usually the choice of technique depends upon the spe¬ 
cific nature of the study. Studies which involve closely 
controlled variables must usually be done in the laboratory, 
while investigatory studies are usually conducted in the 
field. Cost, in terms of time, money, and manpower may 
also dictate which technique must be used. In a given sit¬ 
uation either or both of these factors may favor either 
of the two techniques. Other factors, which are discussed 
below, tend to favor either the laboratory or the field ex¬ 
periment. Usually the choice depends upon a trade off of 
the pros and cons of these factors. 
One particular factor which favors the field experi¬ 
ment is that of the setting. A laboratory setting may ex¬ 
clude too many environmental variables which often have 
significant effects on the results, thus providing the field 
experiment with the advantage. Often the testing of hypoth¬ 
eses in a real world setting also allows for the projection 
of the results into other real world situations, giving a 
29 
scope or dimension to the results not available under the 
laboratory setting. 
A second factor favoring the field experiment is that 
of experimental influence. In the laboratory, both the 
design of the experiment and the experimenter himself may 
influence the results. This is usually a minor problem in 
the real world setting. In the field, the subject is often 
unaware of the experiment, since direct interaction with 
him may not be necessary, or is brief and unobstructive. 
One factor which favors the laboratory experiment is 
that of the manipulation of variables. Often this is the 
purpose of the laboratory experiment, the testing of hy¬ 
potheses under deliberately controlled conditions. This 
control is not available in real world settings and either 
rules out the field experiment or renders it too complex to 
be of value. 
A final factor which usually favors the laboratory ex¬ 
periment is that of sampling. Under planned laboratory 
conditions, estimates of costs and sample returns (in num¬ 
ber of responses) are usually possible and meaningful. Un¬ 
der real world conditions, estimation of either costs or 
returns are often very poor, or even unavailable, since 
they are a direct function of the results, which are not 
estimable. Even the success in completion of a real world 
experiment may not be guaranteed. 
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The Race Track as a Field Experiment Setting 
The race track provides a good example of the advan¬ 
tages of a real world setting. Individuals can behave in 
a natural way, data can be collected with little direct 
intervention by the experimenters, thereby mitigating ex¬ 
perimenter influence, and the results, because they come 
from a real world setting, can be meaningful in other real 
world situations. Yet the race track poses its own prob¬ 
lems . 
Individual privacy is of utmost importance in the race 
track setting. Track management and security officers take 
special efforts to insure this privacy. Individuals them¬ 
selves often act reluctantly or even indignantly when con¬ 
tacted by experimenters. Data collection is difficult un¬ 
der these conditions, with no guarantee of usable results. 
Costs and numerical returns cannot be estimated, since suc¬ 
cess is a function of individual willingness to partici¬ 
pate. In general, however, the advantages of the field ex¬ 
periment more than offset the disadvantages. 
I 
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•CHAPTER II 
HYPOTHESES 
This chapter consists of an exposition and discussion 
of the hypotheses to be considered in this study. It con¬ 
tains: (1) a general discussion of the nature of the hy¬ 
potheses, (2) definition of the terms and variables used 
in the hypotheses, (3) a list of all hypotheses, (4) a 
discussion of the variability hypotheses, (5)’ a discussion 
of the confidence hypotheses, and (6) a summary of all hy¬ 
potheses . 
General Discussion of Hypotheses 
This experiment tests two groups of hypotheses, the 
variability hypotheses and the confidence hypotheses. Both 
individual and aggregate data are used to test the varia¬ 
bility hypotheses. In most instances, individual data is 
aggregated into meaningful sets and these sets of data are 
used to provide the basis for statistical testing. The 
confidence hypotheses use only individual data which, as 
in the variability hypotheses, is aggregated according to 
preset rules and tested statistically. 
The experiment is primarily investigatory in nature. 
The variability hypotheses are designed to provide addi¬ 
tional insight into global human behavior and, as such,are 
not designed to support or disprove any specific behavioral 
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models. The hypotheses themselves are based on previous 
experimental findings, conjectures, and suppositions, which 
appear to be sensible in some form and warrant further in¬ 
vestigation and measurement. 
The confidence hypotheses are designed to replicate 
and supplement results of previous experiments which sup¬ 
ported the theory of cognitive dissonance. Thus these hy¬ 
potheses are based on a particular model. They are not, 
however, primarily attempts to support or disprove this 
model, but are simply uses of the model in an attempt to 
gain insight into the global behavioral problem.. 
Definition cf Terms and Variables 
The following words, "eras and variables are used in 
a specific manner in the hypotheses. They will be defined 
and discussed in turn. 
Variability 
Variability is defined, under the assumption that the 
wager is successful, as the directional difference in the 
financial status subsequent to collection of the ticket, 
relative to the pre-bet status. In this study, the direc¬ 
tional difference always refers to an upside change in as¬ 
set position. 
Thus variability is an attribute of individual behav¬ 
ior and is directly controlled by him. It can be increased 
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in two ways: (1) by increasing the amount of money wa¬ 
gered, and (2) by increasing the proportion of tickets pur¬ 
chased that yield a lower probability of success. This 
second statement can have two different meanings, since an 
individual can merely change the proportion of win, place 
and show tickets purchased while betting on the same horses, 
or he can bet longer odded horses. In either case, he de¬ 
creases the probability that his bet will be successful. 
This study will not directly consider this last alternative 
since the odds on any horse are a function of how the other 
horses are bet and it is not possible, using aggregate in¬ 
dividual data, to show a meaningful change in the propor¬ 
tion of short versus long odded wagers. 
Neophyte and Veteran 
A neophyte is arbitrarily defined as an individual who 
has attended the horse races fewer than three times in his 
lifetime. A veteran is defined as an individual who has 
attended more than fifteen times in his lifetime. For con¬ 
venience, an individual who falls in the three to fifteen 
interval is called a casual. These arbitrary definitions 
reflect the supposition that neophytes are not apt to be 
familiar with track events, while a veteran has attended 
often enough to be quite familiar with track proceedings. 
Program, Card, Meet and Season 
A racing program or race card consists of a number of 
39 
races, usually eight or nine, which are run in a single 
afternoon or evening. A meet consists of a number of race 
cards, usually twenty or forty. Usually there are several 
meets to a racing season, the number depending on the le¬ 
gal allotment of racing days granted by some legislative 
body. 
Pre-Bet, Post-Bet and Post-Time 
Pre-Bet conditions exist during the thirty seconds im¬ 
mediately prior to the actual purchase of a ticket. Post- 
Bet conditions exist during the thirty seconds immediately 
following the purchase of a ticket. Post-Time conditions 
exist during the few minutes prior to the actual commence¬ 
ment of the race. This usually covers a four minute inter¬ 
val. 
Race 
The word race has two meanings in these hypotheses. 
One meaning is simply a reference to an event and should be 
easily recognized as conveying this usual meaning. In sev¬ 
eral places, however, reference is made to "their previous 
race." It would be preferable to use the word wager in 
place of the word race, but it is possible for an indivi¬ 
dual to place several wagers, of different types, during a 
single event, winning some of these and losing others. The 
term net wagers adequately describes the necessary verbage, 
but the word race is used to provide simplicity to the hy- 
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potheses, with the understanding that the reference is to 
the net result of the outcome of all wagers placed on that 
race. 
List of Hypotheses 
Variability Hypotheses 
Variability increases as the race card progresses. 
Relative to winners of their previous race, vari¬ 
ability will increase for those bettors who lost 
their previous race, and will increase even more 
for those bettors who lost their previous race and 
fell below the break-even point simultaneously. 
Individuals who are financially losing prior to 
their last race will wager in such a manner that, 
if they win, they will at least break even for 
the entire racing program. 
Neophytes bet more races than do veterans. 
H(- For any given financial outcome, individuals are 
better satisfied with the race program as a whole 
if they collected a higher percentage of tickets. 
Hr Bettors attending as members of informal groups 
D 
exhibit lower variability than do those attend¬ 
ing as individuals. 
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Confidence Hypotheses 
H^ Relative to Pre-Bet conditions, confidence in 
winning is higher under Post-Time conditions 
and higher yet under Post-Bet conditions. 
Hg Relative to those who lost their previous race 
or are financially below the break-even point, 
confidence in winning is higher for those who 
won their previous race or who are financially 
breaking even for the racing program. 
Hg Relative to losers of both their previous race 
and the entire racing program, the increase in 
confidence in winning between Pre-Bet and Post- 
Bet conditions is greater for those individuals 
who won their previous race or who are winning 
over the entire racing program. 
Discussion of the Variability Hypotheses 
H^ Variability increases as the race card progresses. 
McGlothlin reported that, as the race card progresses, 
the dollar amounts wagered increase in a nearly linear man¬ 
ner, with the amount bet on the feature race being approxi¬ 
mately 80 percent more than the amount bet on the first 
race.^ Some of this increase is attributable to an increase 
in attendance caused by late arrivals but, he claims, the 
increase cannot be explained by this factor alone. He fails 
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to report the basis for this conclusion. McGlothlin also 
reported that the percentage of win dollars increased by 
about 25 percent, the percentage of place dollars purchased 
decreased slightly, while the percentage of show dollars 
purchased decreased about 25 percent as the race card pro- 
2 
gressed from the first to the last race. These findings 
provide the basis for this hypothesis. 
The hypothesis is tested in two different ways. In 
one case, aggregate track data is collected and analyzed 
in the same manner as the McGlothlin work. This analysis 
is a partial replication of his work and provides the basis 
for a direct comparison between his findings and those of 
this study. 
Since his findings were based strictly on aggregate 
data which was not corrected for attendance changes, it is 
useful to test this hypothesis using individual betting 
statistics. This data is collected over the span of each 
racing program and was pooled, race by race. Four vari¬ 
ables: (1) total dollars wagered, (2) percent of win dol¬ 
lars wagered, (3) percent of place dollars wagered, and (4) 
percent of show dollars wagered are derived and plotted, on 
a race by race basis, against the number of the race, using 
the least squares criteria. The slopes of the first two 
regression lines are expected to be positive, while those 
of the second two are expected to be negative. 
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Obviously, the first regression tests the "amount bet" 
component of variability, while the other three test the 
"probability of success" component. 
Relative to winners of their previous race, 
variability will increase for those bettors 
who lost their previous race, and will in¬ 
crease even more for those bettors who lost 
their previous race and fell below the break¬ 
even point simultaneously. 
McGlothlin reported that bettors increase the amount 
wagered more following a loss on the previous race than 
3 
those who won their previous race. Scott claims that 
4 
bettors who win increase their bets, although he says 
nothing about amounts v/agered for those who lost their pre¬ 
vious race. He also claims that winners tend to bet short¬ 
er odded horses,J but again says nothing about what action 
a loser would take. Although his statements do not contra¬ 
dict this hypothesis, it is possible that this is what he 
means, since his collective statements imply the obverse of 
this hypothesis as stated. The McGlothlin statement is 
based on experimental findings, while the Scott statements 
represent untested observations. 
Essentially, this hypothesis is based on the same 
McGlothlin findings as is H^, but represents an attempt to 
pinpoint behavior associated with the increase in variabil¬ 
ity expected under that hypothesis. 
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Individual betting statistics on the number of bets 
placed and the amounts bet for the win, place and show 
categories are collected and pooled under the following 
four classes of bettors: (1) winners of their previous 
race, (2) losers of their previous race who remain above 
the financial break-even point, (3) losers of their previ- 
ous race who fell below the break-even point on that race, 
and (4) losers of their previous race who remain below the 
break-even point on that race. The two variables, amount 
bet, and number of bets placed, are tested across the three 
categories for each of the four classes using a chi-square 
test. The expected variability for class 1 is greater than 
that of class 2 or class 3, which is greater than class 4. 
Individuals who are financially losing prior 
to their last race will wager in such a man¬ 
ner that, if they win, they will at least break 
even for the entire racing program. 
McGlothlin reported that bettors in the eighth race 
(the last race in McGlothlin's study) consistently overbet 
horses odded between 3.5/1 and 5.5/1, and underbet more 
favorably odded horses. He explained this finding by con¬ 
jecturing that many individuals were losing approximately 
three times the amount they expected to bet on their last 
race, and were betting that race in a purposeful attempt to 
at least break even for the entire racing program. Scott 
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also stated that occasional bettors hope to break even for 
the entire race card and will bet their final race in an 
8 
attempt to at least "get well". 
For each individual who is financially losing prior 
to his last race, a record is made of the wagers placed 
during that last race, the amounts wagered, the final odds 
on the horses he bet, and the odds showing at the time he 
» • 
made his decision. Also noted was the amount he was losing 
prior to that last race. It is expected that a significant 
relationship exists between the amount lost up to that 
point in time and the amount to be won if the wager is suc¬ 
cessful. Ticket payoffs to be used will be the actual pay¬ 
offs if he did win or will be based on reported odds. Fi¬ 
nal track odds will be used if the individual failed to re¬ 
port the current odds. 
Neophytes bet more races than do veterans. 
Scott notes that regulars, individuals who attend the 
9 
track on a regular basis, do not bet on every race, wait¬ 
ing until evidence or information provides them with a log¬ 
ical and clearcut basis for handicapping. Although he re¬ 
frains from making the statement, he implies that occasion- 
als tend to bet on every race.1^ Supposedly, this type of 
player attends primarily for the entertainment afforded, 
does not expect to win money, and consequently bets more 
races. The hypothesis is easily tested by counting the 
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number of races bet for both types of individuals, averag¬ 
ing these, and testing, with the expectation that neophytes, 
on the average, bet more often than do veterans. 
For any given financial outcome, individuals 
are better satisfied with the race program as 
a whole if they collected a higher percentage 
of tickets. 
Individuals attend the races with the hope of winning 
money, although many do not expect to win. Thus it is 
apparent that individuals derive satisfaction from winning 
money, since this provides direct evidence of one's ability 
to successfully handicap the horses. The real satisfac¬ 
tion, however, comes from the successful handicapping and 
not the amount of money won. Thus, for a particular finan¬ 
cial outcome, the individual who collected a higher percen¬ 
tage of tickets has handicapped the horses better, and 
should exhibit a greater degree of satisfaction. This is, 
of course, conjectural. 
This hypothesis is tested by obtaining a record of the 
satisfaction each individual expresses toware his atten¬ 
dance of the racing program as a whole, the amount of money 
he won, and the percentage of tickets he collected. A des¬ 
criptive multiple regression will be used, with the stan¬ 
dardized regression coefficient for the percentage of tick¬ 
ets collected expected to be higher than that for the 
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amount of money won. 
H^. Bettors attending as members of informal 
groups exhibit lower variability than do those 
attending as individuals. 
Social psychological theory suggests that individuals 
who are members of informal groups tend to seek status, 
12 
called ascribed status, among members of that group. 
Ability to handicap horses more successfully -than the other 
individual group members should provide such status when 
such ability is actually displayed. This is primarily done 
by either winning money or collecting tickets, or both, and 
overtly displaying this to onlooking fellow grou^ members. 
By decreasing the probability component of variability, the 
individual improves his chances of collecting tickets. But 
a decrease in variability would also mean that the individ¬ 
ual would wager less money and this would reduce his 
chances of collecting tickets. Thus it would seem that the 
individual would increase this component of variability in 
an attempt to achieve status. But, in the long run, the in¬ 
dividual expects to lose money to the track. By reducing 
the amount he wagers, he also reduces the amount of his po¬ 
tential losses, a factor which is also observable by his 
fellow group members and which would tend to reduce his 
group status. Thus, it is expected that group members will 
exhibit overall lower variability in their betting behavior. 
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This reasoning contradicts an observation made by 
Scott. He notes that individuals who are members of groups 
will try to draw attention to themselves by making risky 
13 
bets, thus displaying higher variability in their betting 
behavior. 
This hypothesis is tested by classifying individuals 
as to whether they are attending as group members or alone, 
and comparing both measures of variability, the amount of 
money bet and the percentage of win tickets purchased, for 
the two classes of individuals. Group members are expected 
to wager less money and purchase a smaller percentage of 
win tickets. 
Discussion of the Confidence Hypotheses 
H^ Relative to Pre-Bet conditions, confidence in 
winning is higher under Post-Time conditions 
and higher yet under Post-Bet conditions. 
The theory of cognitive dissonance predicts that, as 
a consequence of a decision, incongruities exist betv/een 
the cognitions of the selected alternative and the cogni¬ 
tions of the rejected alternatives. If the individual is 
committed to his decision and sees it resulting from volun¬ 
tary behavior on his part, he will attempt to reduce the 
dissonance which exists. One result of this dissonance re¬ 
duction process is a reinforcement in the attractiveness of 
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the selected alternative. Thus, if an individual exhibits 
confidence in a wager before he places his bet, the actual 
placing of the bet commits him to this decision, and the 
result of the dissonance reduction process which follows 
is an increase in the confidence in the selected alterna- 
*. • I4 tive. 
Knox and Inkster tested this hypothesis and found that 
the expected increase did take place, and that it took 
place very rapidly, occurring within thirty seconds of the 
15 
actual placement of the wager. 
The stated hypothesis provides for both a replication 
of the Knox and Inkster work and an extension to those 
findings. After the bet is placed, the individual usually 
returns to his seat or standing place. At that vantage 
point he can observe the pools and odds shown on the total¬ 
izator bo^rd, which reflect the general public's opinion of 
the chances that his horse, and all other horses, have to 
win. Also, he usually has some time to reflect upon his 
decision and to re-evaluate the rejected alternatives. It 
is conjectured that his level of confidence in winning will 
decrease slightly as a function of the added information 
and the reflection in thought. Thus the confidence level 
he expresses under Post-Time conditions is expected to be 
less than that expressed under Post-Bet conditions, but, 
because of the on-going dissonance reduction process, it 
» 
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will remain higher than that expressed under Pre-Bet con¬ 
ditions . 
To test this hypothesis, individual expressions of 
confidence in winning are noted for individuals under the 
three conditions, aggregated, and tested. It is expected 
that Post-Bet confidence will exceed Post-Time confidence, 
which, in turn, will exceed Pre-Bet confidence. 
Hg Relative to those who lost their previous race 
or are financially below the break-even point, 
confidence in winning is higher for those who 
won their previous race or who are financially 
breaking even for the racing program. 
The winning of a wager provides evidence that an indi¬ 
vidual possesses some degree of successful handicapping 
ability. This constitutes a reward to the individual, in 
the sense that he has increased his wealth and also is 
shown that he was successful in his objective, that of suc¬ 
cessfully handicapping the race. To the extent that the 
individual is satisfied with such a correct selection, his 
confidence in his ability to select other successful wagers 
would tend to increase. Reinforcement theorists claim that 
such confidence would be reinforced by both a single suc¬ 
cess and particularly by repeated successes.^ This hypoth¬ 
esis is a direct test of that claim. It tests the effect 
on the level of confidence in winning for individuals who 
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just recorded successes, and for those who are winning 
over the entire race card up to that point in time. The 
latter have, in general, more success in handicapping than 
those who are losing up to that point in time. 
Using the Pre-Bet confidence ratings, individual re¬ 
sponses are grouped and averaged under four conditions: 
(1) those who won their previous race and are winning over 
the racing program, (2) those who won their previous race 
and are losing over the racing program, (3) those who lost 
their previous race but are winning over the racing pro¬ 
gram, and (4) those who lost their previous race and are 
losing over the racing program. Confidence in the first 
three categories are compared to the last category, and is 
expected to be greater in each case. 
Hg Relative to losers of both their previous race 
and the entire racing program, the increase in 
confidence in winning between Pre-Bet and Post- 
Bet conditions is greater for those individuals 
who won their previous race or who are winning 
over the entire racing program. 
This hypothesis is based on , and assumes that an in¬ 
crease in confidence in winning actually takes place between 
Pre-Bet and Post-Bet conditions. The stated hypothesis as¬ 
serts that by just having successfully gone through the pro¬ 
cess (having just v/on) or by having successfully gone 
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through the process several times during the racing pro¬ 
gram (winning overall), the dissonance reduction process 
is facilitated, and will reflect an even greater shift in 
increased confidence. 
The hypothesis is tested by averaging confidence rat¬ 
ings for both the Pre-Bet and Post-Bet conditions under 
three categories: (1) losers of their previous race and 
the entire racing, (2) winners of their previous race, and 
(3) winners over the racing card up to that point in time. 
Differences in these ratings are compared, with the expec¬ 
tation that the later two will be greater than the first. 
Summary of Hypotheses 
Variability Hypotheses 
(1) Individuals purchase a higher proportion of win 
tickets and wager more money (increase variabil¬ 
ity) as the racing program progresses. 
(2) Variability of winners of their previous race is 
greater than the variability of losers of their 
previous race, which is, itself, greater than the 
variability of losers of both their previous race 
and the entire racing program. 
(3) Overall losers at the time of their last race will 
wager in an attempt to at least break even if they 
do win. 
(4) Neophytes bet more races than do veterans. 
(5) For a given amount of winnings (losses), indi¬ 
viduals who collected a higher percentage of 
tickets are better satisfied with the racing 
program as a whole. 
(6) Group members exhibit lower variability than 
do those attending alone. 
Confidence Hypotheses 
(7) Confidence in winning is higher just before race 
time, and higher yet just after the bet was 
placed, than it was just before the bet was 
placed. 
(8) Confidence in winning is higher for those who 
won their previous race or are winning overall 
than it is for those who lost their previous 
race and are losing overall. 
(9) The increase in confidence from just prior to 
the placement of the bet to just subsequent to 
the placement of the bet is greater for win¬ 
ners of their previous race or for those who 
are winning overall, when compared to losers 
of both their previous race and the entire 
racing program. 
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C H A P T E R III 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
It was stated in Chapter II that this study consists 
of two different types of hypotheses. The data for these 
two types is collected at different times and under differ¬ 
ent experimental conditions, with the variability‘data be¬ 
ing generated first and the confidence data being generated 
at a later date. 
Two different experimental techniques, an empirical 
investigation and a personal questionnaire, are used to 
generate the variability data, while personal interviews 
are used to generate the confidence data. Since the two 
parts of the study are conducted separately, they are pre¬ 
sented in separate sections of this chapter. 
The Variability Experiments 
As was indicated in the above paragraph, two different 
experimental techniques are used to generate the variabili¬ 
ty data. Both of these experiments were run on three con¬ 
secutive Friday evenings at Green Mountain Race Track in 
Pownal, Vermont. They were run simultaneously, but indepen¬ 
dently, on September 25, October 2, and October 9, 1970. 
The Empirical Investigation 
The objective of this experiment was to gather aggre- 
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gate betting data over twenty-seven thoroughbred horse 
races. Its methodology is straightforward. 
The press box at Green Mountain is located on the top 
of the Clubhouse and Grandstand, overlooking the finish 
line and directly in front of the totalizator board. 
The tote board registers the betting pools as they 
form. At any given time, one can observe the total amount 
of money wagered on win, place, and show bets for the cur¬ 
rent race. Not only are the gross amounts shown, but a 
horse by horse breakdown of these total pools, plus the 
approximate win odds are also displayed. At Green Mountain, 
the tote board is updated at sixty second intervals and di¬ 
rectly controlled by a computer. 
Two experimenters were located in the press box and 
copied the following data onto prepared data forms. 
(1) The morning line. These are win odds predeter¬ 
mined by the track handicapper. They are posted before each 
race and serve as rough guides as to the chance each horse 
has to win. These odds are posted on the tote board until 
enough public money, usually about $250.00 win money, has 
been wagered to make the public odds meaningful. 
(2) The total and the horse by horse betting pools for 
win, place, and show betting, and the approximate win odds. 
This information is updated every sixty seconds. For the 
first few minutes of each betting period, betting is rela- 
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tively light and these statistics change slowly. During 
this period, data is copied every two minutes. For the 
remainder of the betting period, which lasts until the 
race is actually underway, the data is recorded at one 
minute intervals. 
(3) The final pools and the final win odds, which 
appear on the tote board as the race is actually underway. 
(4) The official order of finish for all horses in 
the race. 
(5) Dollar payoffs for win, place, and show tickets. 
(6) Payoffs for special wagers, which include the 
Daily Double, the Big P, and the ninth race Perfecta. 
By special arrangement, the track management furnished, 
at a later date, the following data which does not appear 
on the tote board. 
(1) Betting pools for the special wagers mentioned 
above. 
(2) The handle for the evening. This is the total 
amount wagered for all wagers in the entire race card. 
(3) Total track attendance. 
Also obtained were copies of the program, tip sheets, 
and the Morning Telegraph. All of this data and material 
was collected for each of the three race cards. 
This data is useful in two ways. Some of it is di¬ 
rectly useful to the study, the rest providing a data base 
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useful for subsequent investigation and experimentation. 
Recalling that the McGlothlin work was based on aggregate 
data, the current aggregate data base allows for direct 
comparison between the results of that study and the find¬ 
ings of the current work. It also provides for a check on 
the odds reported by individuals in the main part of the 
variability experiment. 
This data also provides for the complete replication 
of the racing events of the evening and the temporal place¬ 
ment of wagers. It also allows for the computation of the 
exact win, place, and show odds, none of which appear on 
the tote board, which shows only approximate win odds. 
The Personal Questionnaire 
This constitutes the main part of the variability ex¬ 
periment, which was conducted simultaneously with, but in¬ 
dependent of, the empirical investigation reported above. 
The data for this experiment was collected in the Clubhouse 
and the Top of the Paddock, the turf club section at Green 
Mountain, but not in the General Admission area. 
Three separate instruments were used in this part of 
the study. They are discussed separately below. 
The flyer is a one page flyer announcing the experi¬ 
ment. It briefly describes the present study, indicates 
the existence of the McGlothlin work, and promises a copy 
of the results of that study to each individual who volun- 
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teers to participate in the current experiment. It con¬ 
veys, in a commercial way, the general idea that the 
McGlothlin results are of interest to race fans and may 
actually help them in their future betting behavior. A 
copy of this flyer appears in Appendix A. 
The incentive handout is a two page summary of the 
principal results of the McGlothlin study. It serves as 
the principal incentive in the experiment. A copy of this 
instrument appears in Appendix B. 
The data booklet is a three by six inch hardbound 
booklet which serves as the primary data gathering instru¬ 
ment for this experiment. It is apparently unique in that 
no predecessor of its type has been used. Copies of se¬ 
lect pages of the booklet appear in Appendix C. 
The first page provides a place for subjects to re¬ 
quest copies of the results of the current study, which are 
mailed to the participants upon completion of the analysis. 
This also provides information which helps to describe the 
sample, since the home address of each subject is made 
available. 
The second page contains a personal data sheet. Each 
subject supplies the following personal information: (1) 
how many times, in his lifetime, he has attended the horse 
races, (2) with whom he is attending, (3) his yearly in¬ 
come, (4) his occupation, and (5) his age, sex, and marital 
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status. Some of this data is useful in describing the sam¬ 
ple, the rest being used directly in the testing of hypothe¬ 
ses . 
Pages 3 and 4 contain instructions and provide examples 
which help in filling out the rest of the booklet. 
Pages 5 through 16 provide a place for individuals to 
record the following information concerning the wagers made 
during the evening's race card: (1) the number of the horse 
bet, (2) the type of wager placed, (3) the amount wagered, 
(4) the amount collected, (5) the amount won or lost, and 
(6) the win odds showing on the tote board at the time the 
decision to bet was made. A separate page is used for each 
race. Pages are also included for recording the amounts 
wagered, collected, and won or lost for each of the special 
wagers, the Daily Double, the Big P, and the ninth race Per- 
fecta. It is possible for the individual to keep a running 
account of his financial status in this booklet. 
The last page presents a scale upon which the individ¬ 
ual can record his degree of satisfaction with the eve¬ 
ning's entertainment as a whole. 
Methodology 
The ground floor at Green Mountain has, at one end of 
the Grandstand area, a lobby which is used to gain entrance 
to the Clubhouse and the Top of the Paddock. This lobby 
has one entrance from the General Admissions area and sever¬ 
al from the parking areas. Newspapers, tip sheets, pro- 
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grams, and other handicapping aids are sold in the lobby. 
A large elevator operates between this lobby and the third 
floor, where the Clubhouse and the Top of the Paddock are 
located. 
A small table, located directly in front of the ele¬ 
vator entrance and clearly marked "University of Massachu¬ 
setts," is manned by a personable university coed. She 
greets each individual as he approaches the elevator and 
hands him a copy of the flyer. During the ride to the 
third floor, the individual is able to read the flyer and 
decide whether or not to participate in the study, this 
being entirely voluntary on his part. 
A corridor connects the elevator exit to the Club¬ 
house. A long table, again clearly marked "University of 
Massachusetts," is positioned at one side of the corridor. 
This table is manned by two experimenters, one being a uni¬ 
versity coed, who greets each individual as he passes and 
gives him a data booklet and pencil if he requests it. The 
second experimenter is a university professor who stays at 
the table throughout the evening to answer questions and 
perform public relations functions for the experimental ef¬ 
fort. 
When individuals leave to go home, they again must pass 
by the table in the corridor. Subjects turn in their com¬ 
pleted data booklets and are given a copy of the incentive 
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handout. They are personally thanked for their participa¬ 
tion. An experimenter records the time each booklet is 
turned in. 
The lobby table is manned until the third race is com¬ 
plete, most race fans having arrived by that time. The 
corridor table is manned at all times. 
After the races, when the Clubhouse is empty, the en¬ 
tire area, including waste receptacles, is scouted for dis¬ 
carded data booklets. Some of these are partially com¬ 
pleted and provide useful information, while others are 
blank and can be recycled. An analysis of these discarded 
booklets provided insight into the data collection process, 
since no predecessor of its type was available and its suc¬ 
cess was uncertain. 
This data collected under this main part of the vari¬ 
ability experiment was used in the direct testing of hy¬ 
potheses . 
The Confidence Experiment 
Personal interviews provide the data for the confidence 
experiment. These interviews were conducted on the even¬ 
ings of Thursday, October 22, and Friday, October 23, 1970 
at Green Mountain Race Track. Data was collected in the 
General Admission area only. 
One data instrument, the confidence scale, is used in 
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this experiment. This consists of a twenty centimeter long 
horizontal line, with end bars, printed on an eleven by 
three inch piece of paper. At the extreme right end, di¬ 
rectly above the end bar, appear the words "Complete Confi¬ 
dence". At the left end, in the corresponding position, 
appear the words "No Confidence". This scale is identical 
o 
to the one used by Knox and Inkster in their second experi¬ 
ment, which is shown in Figure 2 in Chapter I. The use of 
their scale provides a basis for the comparison of the re¬ 
sults of this study to their work. At Green Mountain, the 
grandstand houses two large betting areas, one on the first 
floor, another on the second floor. These areas are both 
accessible from the grandstand, which lies above and in 
front of them. Underneath the grandstand and in front of 
the lower betting area is an enclosed area for standing. A 
large apron between the grandstand and the track is also 
provided for standing. Only the ground floor betting area 
was open during weekdays late in the season and was, conse¬ 
quently, the only one used in this experiment. Because of 
the small weekday crowds, approximately one half of the 
betting windows were not open when the experiment was run. 
Five two dollar win windows were open, these being isolated 
from other windows because of closed windows on both sides. 
Because of this isolation, the Pre-Bet and Post-Bet experi¬ 
ments were conducted in front of these five windows. The 
I 
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Post-Time experiment was conducted in the standing areas 
in front of the grandstand. 
Five experimenters took part, including the writer, 
who directed the experiment, answered questions posed by 
curious individuals, and recorded statistics concerning 
the composition of the sample. Four undergraduate univer¬ 
sity coeds conducted the actual interviewing. Each girl 
was supplied with a marking per. and a booklet of confidence 
scales. 
The Pre-Bet Experiment 
During the second through the sixth races of Thursday, 
October 22, data for the Pre-Bet experiment was collected. 
The four girls were stationed approximately fifteen feet 
directly in front of the five win windows. As individuals 
approached the windows to place their bets, they were inter¬ 
cepted by an experimenter and the following interview took 
place. 
"Hello. I am from the University of Massachusetts. 
I am gathering data for a research project. Would you mind 
if I asked you a couple of questions? It will take only 
about thirty seconds." 
If the subject agrees, the interview continues. If he 
chooses not to participate, he is thanked and the interview 
is terminated. 
"I wonder if you would please look at this scale? Us¬ 
ing this pen, would you please indicate how confident you 
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are that the horse you are about to bet will win? All you 
need to do is place a mark on the scale. The more confi¬ 
dent you are, the further to the right your mark should 
go." 
After the scale is marked, the following two questions 
were asked. 
"Did you win your last bet?" 
"Are you winning up to this point in the evening?" 
At this point the interview is over. The subject is 
thanked and allowed to proceed with the placement of his 
bet. The experimenter records the answers to the two ques¬ 
tions by coding the confidence scale. 
The Post-Bet Experiment 
The data for the Post-Bet experiment was collected 
during the second through sixth races of Friday, October 
we. The Post-Bet procedure was identical to the Pre-Bet 
procedure, except individuals were approached as they left 
the betting windows after placement of their bet. Conse¬ 
quently, the words "horse you are about to bet" were re¬ 
placed by the words "horse you just bet". 
The Post-Time Experiment 
Data for the Post-Time experiment was collected during 
the seventh and eight races of October 22 and 23. The four 
experimenters circulated among the crowd which was standing 
either under the grandstand or on the apron by the track, 
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apparently waiting for the race to be run. Individuals, 
selected at random, were approached, and the interview, i- 
dentical to the Post-Bet interview took place. It was, 
however, first necessary to determine that the individual 
held a win ticket on a horse in that race. Immediately 
after he agreed to participate, he was asked this question. 
If his answer was in the affirmative, the interview took 
place. 
Under all three experimental conditions, the experi¬ 
menters were held strictly to the above procedure. Minor 
modifications in the verbal exchange were allowed and addi¬ 
tional instructions for marking the scale were allowed pro¬ 
vided this was necessary. The experimenters were not al¬ 
lowed, however, to point or indicate any point on the scale 
which might influence the response of the subject. The 
girls could answer questions and exchange pleasantries, pro¬ 
vided that these were initiated by the subject. 
The interviewing was terminated either two minutes be¬ 
fore post time or when queues began to form in front of the 
windows, whichever came first. Interviewing did not take 
place under crowded or hectic conditions at any time. 
The data collected under these experiments was used for 
the direct testing of the confidence hypotheses. 
I 
C. H A P T E R IV 
RESULTS OF THE VARIABILITY HYPOTHESES1 
In this chapter, results of the six variability hy¬ 
potheses are presented. Each hypothesis is discussed sep¬ 
arately, except when a particular hypothesis is a logical 
extension to a previously discussed one. Otherwise the in¬ 
terrelationships which exist between them are discussed in 
the Summary and Conclusions chapter. 
Discussion of H^ 
H^ Variability increases as the race card progresses. 
This hypothesis is tested using two different experi¬ 
ments. The first is an aggregate empirical investigation, 
which actually replicates the McGlothlin work, while the 
second parallels the first using data derived from individ¬ 
ual betting records. These two investigations are dis¬ 
cussed separately below. 
The Aggregate Investigation 
Recall that, by definition, variability can be in¬ 
creased in two ways. The first way is by increasing the 
amount of money wagered during a particular race, hereafter 
referred to as the amount wagered component of variability, 
and the second is by increasing the proportion of bets 
which have a low probability of success, hereafter referred 
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to as the probability component of variability. As was 
previously reported, McGlothlin performed an aggregate an¬ 
alysis which tested both components of variability. He 
found that the amount of money wagered per race was in¬ 
creased in a nearly linear manner over the race card, with 
the amount bet during the feature race being approximately 
c 
80 percent greater than the amount bet during the first 
race. He also reported that the percent of win tickets 
purchased increased about 25 percent, the percent of place 
tickets purchased decreased slightly, and the percent of 
show tickets purchased decreased about 25 percent over the 
course of the racing program. These findings are shown in 
2 
Figure 3. 
McGlothlin's sample included 9605 races. Although the 
present study includes only twenty-seven races, a relative¬ 
ly small sample size, the aggregate experiment is repli¬ 
cated in this study. 
As is shown in Figure 4, the total dollars wagered, for 
all three race cards, was plotted against the number of the 
race. Note that, for the first, fifth, and ninth races, two 
different points are plotted, one including only regular 
bets, the second including both regular and special bets. 
These special bets include the Daily Double in the first 
race, the Big P in the fifth race, and the Perfecta in the 
ninth race. Obviously, the betting of special bets reduces 
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Figure 3. Proportion of Total Mutual Bet in Win 
Place, and Show Pools as a Function 
of Number of Race — McGlothlin data. 
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Figure 4. Total Dollars Bet for Win, Place and 
Show as a Function of Race Number -- 
Aggregate Data. 
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the amounts wagered on the regular bets. The McGlothlin 
study was conducted before special bets were popular, other 
than perhaps the Daily Double, and his study made no men¬ 
tion of them. Consequently, data for the first, fifth, and 
ninth races cannot be directly compared to the corresponding 
data of his study. 
A linear least squares regression line was fitted to 
the data points of Figure 4, using only those-points not 
affected by special wagers. Using this regression line, 
values for the first and eighth races were derived and found 
to be $28,920 and $45,020 respectively. The latter value is 
56 percent greater than the first, indicating a rate of in¬ 
crease somewhat lower than that reported by McGlothlin. 
Note that McGlothlin's 80 percent increase took place over 
seven races, while the current 56 percent increase occurred 
over eight races. If a non-linear regression line had been 
fitted to the data in Figure 4, the average rate of increase 
would have been greater than 56 percent. 
In general, this replication of the McGlothlin study 
confirms his findings, although neither the linearity assump¬ 
tion nor the actual rate of increase were reproduced. These 
discrepancies could result from several factors, the small 
sample size and sample bias being prime examples. Recall 
that the current study utilizes data collected only on Friday 
evenings late in the racing season, whereas the McGlothlin 
I 
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data was generated over many races. The present sample is 
obviously biased, but, nevertheless, indicates the same 
general tendencies as found in the McGlothlin study. 
The probability component of variability was also 
tested under this aggregate investigation. Again, the Mc¬ 
Glothlin methodology was used. Percent of win, place, and 
show dollars wagered were calculated for each of the nine 
races. These values appear in Table 1 and are plotted in 
Figure 5. Linear least squares regression lines were fit¬ 
ted to the plots in Figure 5. Using these regression 
lines, the values for the first and eighth races were de¬ 
rived. These values are shown in Table 2. 
When comparing Figure 5 to Figure 3, it is obvious 
that the general direction and magnitude of change for the 
win, place, and show plots are roughly the same for both 
studies. The percent change for the win and show plots 
are, however, quite different. Note that, in the current 
study, a higher percent of win tickets was purchased, at 
the expense of show tickets purchased. Consequently, the 
bases used for the percent of change computations are quite 
different, this accounting for the discrepancy in the mag¬ 
nitude of the percent changes reported above. 
The present study was conducted late in the racing 
season. It would be fair to speculate that a relatively 
large proportion of "hard core" race fans were in atten- 
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Figure 5. Percent of Dollars Wagered for Win, 
Place and Show as a Function of 
Number of Race — Aggregate Data. 
I 
Race Win Place Show 
1 60. 89 26.04 13.07 
2 62.18 25.20 12.62 
3 60.80 26.50 12. 70 
4 63. 79 24.71 11.50 
5 58.50 27.47 14.03 
6 62. 51 25. 42 12.07 
7 66.60 23.61 9.79 
8 66.06 25. 88 8.06 
9 67.05 22.08 10.87 ' 
Table 1. Percent of Win, Place, and 
Show Dollars Wagered -- 
Aggregate Data. 
First 
Race 
Value 
Eighth 
Race 
Value 
Percent 
Increase 
Win 60.06 66.22 10.25 
Place 26.45 23.97 -9.40 
Show 13. 48 9.80 -36.65 
Table 2. First and Eighth Race Values 
for Regression Lines of Per¬ 
cent of Dollars Wagered, and 
Percent of Increase Between 
These Values -- Aggregate Data. 
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3 
dance during this study. This is partially substantiated 
by the finding, in the individual investigation of this 
study, that 87 percent of the subjects responding had at¬ 
tended the races more than fifteen times during their life¬ 
times. One would expect that these individuals would bet 
4 
relatively more win money. More is said about this in the 
discussion of . 
Other than the minor discrepancies noted above, the 
present replication of the aggregate investigation tends to 
confirm the McGlothlin findings. 
The Individual Investigation 
This part of the study parallels that of the aggregate 
investigation reported above. Recall that the McGlothlin 
study, as well as the study reported above, utilize aggre¬ 
gate data. This data could not be corrected for changes in 
attendance. As a result of this, the findings of those in¬ 
vestigations may be in error. Quite probably, the increase 
in the amount wagered component of variability was partial¬ 
ly a function of late arrivals swelling the attendance as 
the evening progressed. This was conjectured by McGlothlin, 
although he believed that the reported increase could not 
be accounted for by this factor alone. The following anal¬ 
ysis tests this conjecture. 
The average size of wagers placed was calculated on a 
race by race basis, and these were plotted against the num- 
76 
ber of the race. This is shown in Figure 6. For reasons 
set forth in the previous section, the averages for the 
first, fifth, and ninth races were not used. A linear 
least squares regression line was fitted to the six remain¬ 
ing data points. Using this regression line, the values 
for the first and eighth races were determined to be $6.35 
and $7.73 respectively. The increase is 21.75 percent. 
This value was derived while holding the attendance, vari¬ 
able constant and, even when compared to the 56 and 80 per¬ 
cent increases reported earlier, lend strong support to the 
McGlothlin conjecture that an increase in variability actu¬ 
ally takes place. 
The probability component of variability was also 
tested using average amounts of money wagered instead of 
the aggregate totals. Percents for win, place, and show 
wagers are shown in Table 3, and are plotted against the 
number of the race in Figure 7. Linear least squares re¬ 
gression lines were fitted to these plots. Using the re¬ 
gression lines, values for the first and eighth races, and 
the rate of change between them, were derived. These are 
shown in Table 4. Note that the show regression lines of 
Figures 7 and 5 differ only slightly, while the direction¬ 
ality of the win and place regression lines are reversed. 
Note that the sample for this study was derived from 
Clubhouse fans only and was, therefore, biased not only 
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Figure 6. Average Dollars Wagered as a 
Function of Number of Race -- 
Individual Data 
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Show 
Figure 7. Percent of Dollars Wagered for Win, 
Place, and Show as a Function of 
Number of Race -- Individual Data. 
Race Win Place Show 
1 63.6 21.1 15. 3 
2 68.1 19.6 12. 3 
3 63. 2 27.7 9.1 
4 67.0 24.5 8.5 
5 58.0 21.5 20.5 
6 58.6 27.7 13.7 
7 54.7 35.5 9. 8 
8 61.2 29.7 9.1 
9 64.9 27.1 9.0 
Table 3. Percent of Dollars Wagered for 
Win, Place, and Show -- 
Individual Data. 
First 
Race 
Value 
Eighth 
Race 
Value 
Percent 
Increase 
Win 64.87 60.10 -7.35 
Place 21.15 29.53 39.60 
Show 13.95 10.21 -26.80 
Table 4. First and Eighth Race Values for 
Regression Lines for Percent of 
Dollars Wagered in Win, Place, 
and Show, and Percent of Increase 
Between these Values -- Individual 
Data. 
I 
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temporally, but also as to composition. In view of this, 
it appears that the probability component of variability 
can vary among subsamples of the population. 
Apparently the Clubhouse subjects start their evening 
by betting relatively more money on win bets than do race 
fans in general. Since the track will win over the long 
run, it is possible that losses in the early part of the 
program will be particularly large for many individuals and 
will cause individuals to change their betting patterns, 
with a subsequent reduction in variability. It is, of 
course, possible that all subgroups, since they will all 
lose in the long run, will show changes in their betting 
patterns over the course of the racing program, and that a 
change in variability might result for all subgroups. 
In summary, the amount bet component of variability 
increased under both experimental conditions. The proba¬ 
bility component increased under the aggregate investiga¬ 
tion, but was mixed under the individual investigation. 
In general, this hypothesis was confirmed, but with the 
reservation that, for at least one subgroup, the probabil¬ 
ity component decreased. 
Discussion of 
Relative to winners of their previous race, vari¬ 
ability will increase for those bettors who lost 
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their previous race and will increase even more 
for those bettors who lost their previous race 
and fell below the break-even point simultane¬ 
ously. 
Although it may not be universal throughout all sub¬ 
groups of the population, the indication, substantiated by 
the McGlothlin study and the work done under the first hy¬ 
pothesis, is that both components of variability increase 
as the race card progresses. It was conjectured, in the 
discussion following the first hypothesis, that losers may 
react by changing variability, in an attempt to mitigate 
further losses. 
This hypothesis represents an attempt to determine re¬ 
lationships associated with the increased variability ex¬ 
pected under the previous hypothesis. It specifically at¬ 
tempts to relate increased variability to a loss of the 
previous race, thus providing an explanation for the change 
reported under the first hypothesis. 
As was previously indicated, McGlothlin claimed that 
bettors increase the amount wagered more following a loss 
than following a win. Scott suggests just the opposite, 
indicating that winners are the ones who increase the 
amount wagered. He also claims that winners tend to bet 
shorter odded horses. McGlothlin makes no statement as 
to the probability component of variability being a func- 
I 
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tion of the outcome of previous races. Since McGlothlin's 
comments were based on experimental results while Scott's 
were based on observations, the 2-lcGlothlin viewpoint was 
adopted as the basis for this hypothesis. 
In the following experiment, data was collected and 
grouped under four categories: (1) winners of their pre¬ 
vious race, (2) losers of their previous race who remain 
above the financial break-even point, (3) losers of their 
previous race who fell below the break-even point on that 
i 
race, and (4) losers of their previous race who remained 
below the break-even point. These categories will here¬ 
after be referred to by nemonic codes, these being WPR 
(winners previous race), LABE (losers above break-even), 
LTBE (losers through break-even) , and LBBE (losers below 
break-even) respectively. 
Both components of variability are tested under this 
hypothesis, and are discussed separately below. 
The Amount hagered Component of Variability 
The distribution of amounts bet is discrete, resembles 
a negative exponential distribution, has one mode and its 
median at the value $2.00, another mode at approximately 
$10.00, and is badly skewed with the tail to the right. It 
is quite different from a normal distribution. Since par¬ 
ametric statistical tests require normal (or nearly normal) 
underlying distributions, they are not usable for testing 
I 
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this or later hypotheses. Consequently, non-parametric 
tests are used throughout this study. These tests are all 
standard tests and will not require separate discussion.$'^ 
If the parametric tests were used, the average amount 
bet under each of the four categories mentioned above could 
be calculated, and the differences in these averages tested. 
Using the non-parametric tests, the two components which 
determine the average, the total dollars spent and the num¬ 
ber of individuals, are tested separately. These tests are 
) 
discussed separately below. 
The number of individuals who either increased or de¬ 
creased their wager was noted for all four categories. 
These values are shown in Table 5. Table 6 shows the per¬ 
cent of these individuals who increased their wager. 
A one-sample chi-square test was run on the totals of 
individuals who either increased or decreased their bets. 
These totals are shown in the last column of Table 5. The 
chi-square value was 4.025, with one degree of freedom, 
which is significant beyond the .04 level of confidence. 
This gives strong evidence that individuals, in general, 
increase the amount bet component of variability, and lends 
support to the first hypothesis. 
Referring to Table 6, note that the LABE and LBBE cat¬ 
egories exhibit little difference, while WPR shows a higher 
percentage and LTBE shows a lower percentage. A chi-square 
WPR LABE LTBE LBBE Totals 
Increased 64 18 7 89 179 
Decreased 41 14 10 78 143 
Totals 106 32 17 167 322 
Table 5. Number of Individuals who Increased 
or Decreased Their Wagers under WPR, 
LABE, LTBE, and LBBE Categories. 
WPR LABE LTBE LBBE 
61.5 56.1 41.2 53.4 
Table 6. Percent of Individuals Who 
Increased Their Wagers under 
WPR, LABE, LTBE, and LBBE 
Categories. 
I 
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test for two independent samples was run for the two most 
extreme categories, WPR and LTEE. The chi-square value 
was 1.98, with one degree of freedom, which is significant 
at the .15 level of confidence. Thus one would accept the 
hypothesis that no difference exists between these two cat¬ 
egories. If no difference exists between the most extreme 
categories, no difference can exist between any two of them. 
* . 
The conclusion is justified that, among the four categories, 
no difference exists among the proportion of individuals who 
♦ 
increase or decrease their wager. 
The data in Table 7, the total dollars wagered, was 
analyzed in the same manner as the data in Table 5, the num¬ 
ber of individuals. The percent of increase in total dol¬ 
lars, for each of the four categories, is shown in Table 8. 
A one-sample chi-square test was run for the group totals 
which appear in the last column of Table 7. The chi-square 
value was 7.86, with one degree of freedom, which is signif¬ 
icant beyond the .001 level of confidence. This is strong 
evidence that the amount wagered component of variability 
increases for all individuals, which again supports the 
first hypothesis. 
Chi-square tests were run betv/een pairs of categories 
shown in Table 7. For the categories LABE and LTBE, the 
chi-square value was .13, with one degree of freedom, this 
being significant at the .70 level of confidence, and indi- 
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eating a difference between all other pairs of categories. 
The chi-square value for the WPR and LBBE categories was 
5.6, with one degree of freedom, which is significant be¬ 
yond the .02 level of confidence. The chi-square value for 
the LBBE and LTBE categories was 7.94, with one degree of 
freedom, which is significant well beyond the .001 level of 
confidence. Other than the LABE and LTBE and the WPR and 
LTBE categories, which were just discussed, all other pairs 
of categories were more extreme than the LBBE and LTBE pair, 
« 
and thus show a significant difference. 
Thus, it is appropriate to conclude that, taking the 
entire amount wagered component of variability into con- 
sideration, the variability for the WPR category is greater 
than that of either the LBBE or LABE categories, and these, 
in turn exhibit greater variability than the LTBE category. 
Note that this hypothesis calls for the WPR variability to 
be lower, not greater than the other categories. 
The Probability Component of Variability 
An investigation of the probability component of vari¬ 
ability, paralleling that of the amount bet component, is 
undertaken in this section. The number of win, place, and 
show wagers, for each of the four categories, was recorded 
and are shown in Table 9. A chi-square test for three in¬ 
dependent samples was run for this data. The chi-square 
value was 8.82, with six degrees of freedom, which is sig- 
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WPR LABE LTBE LBBE Totals 
Increased 532 67 43 542 1184 
Decreased 288 75 55 373 791 
Totals 820 142 98 915 1975 
Table 7. Total Dollars Wagered by Individuals 
Who Increased or Decreased•Their 
Wagers under WPR, LABE, LTBE, LBBE 
Categories. 
WPR LABE LTBE LBBE 
64.9 43.7 43.9 59.3 
Percent of Dollars Wagered by 
Individuals Who Increased Their 
Wager under WPR, LABE, LTBE, 
and LBBE Categories. 
Table 8 
WPR LABE LTBE LBBE 
Win 137 57 17 314 
Place 92 28 9 158 
• 
Show 54 13 9 78 
Table 9. 
• 
Number of Wagers for Win, 
and Show under V7PR, LABE, 
and LBBE Categories. 
Place, 
LTBE, 
WPR LABE LTBE LBBE 
Win 154 53 19 300 
Place 84 29 10 163 
Show 45 16 6 87 
Table 10. Expected Number of Wagers for 
Win, Place, and Show under WPR, 
LABE, LTBE, AND LBBE Categories. 
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nificant at the .19 level of confidence. The expected 
number of win, place, and show wagers, for each of the 
four categories, was calculated and is shown in Table 10. 
A comparison of Tables 9 and 10 indicates that the WPR catti- 
gory exhibits slightly lower variability and the LBBE cate¬ 
gory exhibits slightly higher variability than expected, 
although the difference is not significant. 
The total dollars wagered for win, place,'and show, 
for the four categories, is shown in Table 11. A chi-square 
/ 
test was run for this data. The chi-square value was 54.7, 
v/ith six degrees of freedom, which is significant we I I be¬ 
yond the .001 level of confidence. The expected values for 
the data of Table 11 are shown in Table 12. A comparison 
of these values shows that the variability for the Wid< cate¬ 
gory is much lower than expected, while that oJ the LBBK 
category is much higher than expected. This is the* same 
conclusion reached in the preceding analysis. These rela¬ 
tionships show up well in Table 19, which shows the* average 
size of the bet, lot win, place, and show for each of i lie 
four categories. 
Jn conclusion, the variabili ty for i la- MJBE eategoiy 
was found to be greater than the BABB category, which in 
turn, v/as found to be greater than f h< i/rm: category. These 
relationships v/ere found unde/ both the amount wagered arid 
the probability i nvesl ig/it ions, and ag/ee v/i f h those staled 
WPR LABE LTBE LBBE 
• 
Win 1047 212 100 1534 
Place 
t 
516 110 50 563 
• 
Show 259 38 32 207 
Table 11. Total Dollars Wagered for Win, 
Place, and Show under WPR, 
LABE, LTBE, and LBBE Categories. 
WPR LABE LTBE LBBE 
Win 1130 223 113 1427 
Place 484 96 48 612 
Shov; 208 44 21 265 
Expected Total Dollars Wagered for 
Win, Place, and Show under WPR, LABE, 
LTEE, and LBBE Categories. 
Table 12 
WPR LABE LTBE LBBE 
Win 7.65 3. 72 5.88. 4.86 
Place 
i 
5.61 3.93 5.56 3.99 
Show 4.80 2.92 3.56 2.65 
Table 13. Average Size of Wagers, in Dollars, 
for Win, Place, and Show under WPR, 
LABE, LTBE, and LBBE Categories. 
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under this hypothesis. Variability for the WPR category 
was found to be greater than any other category in the 
amount wagered investigation, which contradicts this hy¬ 
pothesis and supports the Scott claim that winners in¬ 
crease the amount of their bet more than do losers. The 
probability investigation showed that the variability for 
the V7PR category is lower than any other category, which 
agrees with this hypothesis. 
In general, the hypothesis was confirmed, but strong 
0 
evidence was found to support the conclusion that the two 
components of variability, under certain conditions, should 
be considered separately, since agreement between them is 
not ensured. 
Discussion of H0 
Individuals who are losing prior to their last 
race will wager in such a manner that, if they 
win, they v/ill at least break even for the en¬ 
tire racing program. 
Both Scott and McGlothlin indicated that individuals 
who were below the break-even point would bet their last 
race in an attempt to break even. This hypothesis direct¬ 
ly tests this conjecture. 
Data was collected from all individuals who were fi¬ 
nancially losing prior to their last race and who placed 
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a regular bet during that race. Of the 121 participants 
in the study, 86 were losing prior to their last race, and 
60 of these individuals placed a regular wager on that 
last race. The other twenty-six bet special wagers only, 
this usually being the ninth race Perfecta. Of these 
twenty-six, all of them could expect to break even if they 
won, since the average Perfecta payoff is high enough to 
offset the losses for each of these individuals. 
For the remaining sixty subjects, the amount they 
were losing, and the variability for their last race was 
recorded. This variability was based on the amount they 
bet during that last race, and the odds showing on the tote 
board at the time they made their decision to bet. If the 
individual failed to report these odds, final track odds 
were used. If their bet was successful, the actual payoff 
was used as the variability value. A Spearman rank corre¬ 
lation, corrected for ties, was run between the two vari¬ 
ables, the amount lost and the variability. The correla¬ 
tion coefficient, for the sample size of sixty, was .596. 
This value is significant at the .03 level of confidence, 
indicating a strong relationship between the two variables. 
It was noticeable that some of the variability values far 
exceeded the loss value for a given individual. Since the 
hypothesis states that individuals bet to at least break 
, < 
even, this tends to further support the hypothesis. Con- 
I 
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sidering this factor and the significance level of the cor¬ 
relation coefficient, the hypothesis is strongly confirmed. 
Discussion of H . 
Neophytes bet more races than do veterans. 
This hypothesis tests Scott's observation that occa¬ 
sional bettors tend to bet every race while regular bettors 
will bet only those races where clear-cut handicapping evi¬ 
dence is available. 
Subjects were divided into the following three cate¬ 
gories: (1) neophytes, who had previously attended the 
horse races fewer than three times in their lifetime, (2) 
casuals, who had attended between three and fifteen times, 
and (3) veterans, who had attended more than fifteen times 
during their lifetime. Of the 121 participants, 108 re¬ 
sponded to this question, with 94 of these individuals be¬ 
ing classed as veterans, 10 as casuals, and only 4 as neo¬ 
phytes . 
Since the class size for neophytes was so small, the 
original test for this hypothesis was not run. Instead, 
the neophyte and casual classes were combined into a single 
class, as is common statistical practice. The data for the 
two remaining classes was used for testing. This data is 
shown in Table 14. 
A chi-square test was run using this data. The chi- 
Neophytes 
plus 
Casuals 
Veterans 
Races 
Attended 108 795 
Races 
Bet 94 592 
Table 14. Number of Races Bet and Attended 
for Veterans and Neophytes plus 
Casuals. 
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square value was .87, with one degree of freedom, which is 
significant at the .38 level of confidence. It is readily 
concluded that no significant difference exists between 
these two classes, providing evidence that this hypothesis 
is not confirmed. 
The percent of races bet was 85.3 for neophytes and 
87.0 for casuals, lending strong support for combining this 
data into a single class. The percent of races bet by vet¬ 
erans was 74.9, which is lower, but not significantly so, 
# 
than the others. This does, however, suggest that the hy¬ 
pothesis is stated in the correct direction. 
% • 
Discussion of H_ 
D 
Hj. For any given financial outcome, individuals 
are better satisfied with the race program as 
a whole if they collected a higher percent of 
tickets. 
In Chapter II, it was conjectured that individual sat¬ 
isfaction derived from horse racing was a function of the 
amount won and the number of tickets collected, with the 
latter being the more important variable. This hypothesis 
directly tests that conjecture. 
To test this hypothesis, the degree of satisfaction 
with the evening as a whole, the amount of money won or 
lost, and the percent of tickets collected was either re- 
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corded or calculated for each individual. A descriptive 
multiple regression was run using this data, with the de¬ 
gree of satisfaction being the dependent variable, Y. The 
amount won variable is defined as X. , and the percent of 
tickets collected is defined as X~ . The regression equa¬ 
tion was: 
Y = 53.1225 + .019 X. - .0358 X2 
2 
The coefficient of determination, R , was .296, indi¬ 
cating that only about 30 percent of the total variation 
was explained by these two variables. Variables not con¬ 
sidered in this study would account for more of the degree 
of satisfaction variation. 
The regression coefficients were standardized, with 
the beta coefficients being .04153 for X^ and -.00016 for 
X^. Obviously, the amount won is the more important var¬ 
iable. 
Considering the size of the coefficient of determina¬ 
tion and the relationship between the beta coefficients, 
it is obvious that the percent of tickets collected is an 
unimportant variable when used to explain the degree of 
satisfaction derived from the racing program, as a whole. 
Even the sign of the regression coefficient for this vari¬ 
able is reversed. The amount won, however, is an important 
variable. The above analysis fails to confirm the hypothe¬ 
sis as stated. 
I 
Discussion of H 
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Hg Bettors attending as members of informal groups 
exhibit lower variability than do those attend¬ 
ing as individuals. 
In Chapter II, it was conjectured that, in an attempt 
to achieve status within the group, members would exhibit 
lower variability in their betting behavior. Scott, how¬ 
ever, claimed that variability would increase for group 
members, since they would try to draw attention to them¬ 
selves by making risky bets. This hypothesis will test 
these conflicting conjectures. 
In this test, individuals were separated into three 
groups: (1) those attending as members of an informal 
group, (2) those who are attending with members of their 
family, and (3) those who are attending alone. Both the 
amount bet and the probability components of variability 
are tested, and are discussed separately below. 
The Amount Wagered Component of Variability 
Of the 121 subjects who participated, 111 placed regu 
lar bets at some point during the racing program. The num 
ber of races bet varied from individual to individual. 
Consequently, the average amount bet per regular wager was 
calculated for each of the 111 individuals, this value be¬ 
ing used for the statistical testing. 
99 
A cumulative distribution over the average amount bet 
was derived for each of the three groups mentioned above. 
Since the informal group and the family group categories 
exhibited similar cumulative distributions, a two-tailed 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test was run for these cate¬ 
gories. The chi-square value was .95, with two degrees of 
freedom, which is significant at the .60 level of confi¬ 
dence. This indicates no difference between the two cate¬ 
gories and, as a consequence, these two were combined into 
a single category. 
The distributions for the two remaining categories 
were also tested using the two-tailed Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
two-sample test. The chi-square value was 4.4, with two 
degrees of freedom, which is significant at the .11 level 
of confidence. Although one cannot claim a significant 
difference between these two distributions, the relatively 
high chi-square value indicates that such a difference is 
suspect. The two cumulative distributions under question 
are shown in Table 15. The average amount bet for indivi¬ 
duals who attended alone was $9.28, while that for those 
attending as members of a family or informal group was 
$5.49. 
The above analysis gives some indication that the 
amount bet component of variability is lower for group mem¬ 
bers, although this difference is not as large as expected 
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under the hypothesis. 
The Probability Component of Variability 
Since the variability for family and informal group cat 
egories was quite similar under the amount bet analysis, 
these two categories were tested in this analysis. The num¬ 
ber of individual bets for the win, place, and show classes 
for these two categories is shown in Table 16. A chi-square 
test was run for this data, with the chi-square value being 
1.035, with two degrees of freedom. This value is signifi¬ 
cant at the .60 level of confidence, and gives indication 
that no difference exists between the two categories. Con¬ 
sequently, they were combined into a single category. 
The number of individual bets placed for the win, place 
and show classes for the two remaining categories are shown 
in Table 17. A chi-square test was run for this data, the 
chi-square value being 19.1, with two degrees of freedom. 
This value is significant well beyond the .001 level of con¬ 
fidence, indicating that variability for group members is 
higher than expected. The expected number of individual 
bets for each cell of Table 17 is shown in Table 18. These 
findings disconfirm the hypothesis, as stated, and lend 
strong support to the Scott conjecture that variability is 
higher for group members. 
An analysis was run using the total dollars wagered for 
the win, place, and show classes for each of the categories 
102 
# 
Kin Place Show Total 
Family 310 107 56. 473 
In for:: a 1 
Group 165 63 38 266 
locals 475 170 94 739 
ladle 16. !• of Individual Bets Pieces Under 
Kin, Piece, end Show Classes for Eerily 
and Infernal Group Cacecories. 
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Alone 
Family plus 
Informal Group 
Totals 
Table 17. 
f 
Win Place Shov; Totals 
146 107 56 309 
475 195 
0 
98 768 
621 302 154 1077 
Kurr-fcer of Individual Bet.-; Placed under 
Win, Place, and Show Classes for the 
Alone and Family plus Informal Group 
Categories. 
Win Place Show Totals 
Alone 178 ’ 87 4,4 309 
Family plus 
Informal Group 443 215 110 768 
Totals 621 302 154 1077 
Table 18. Expected Number of Individual Bets Placed 
under Win, Place, and Show Classes for 
the Alone and Family plus Informal Group 
Categories. 
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mentioned above. Again, the difference between the family 
and informal group categories was tested using the chi- 
square test. The values for these two groups appear in Table 
19. The chi-square value was .71, with two degrees of free¬ 
dom, which is significant at the .70 level of confidence. 
This indicates no difference between the two categories and, 
as a consequence, they were combined into a single category. 
The total dollars wagered under the win, place and show 
classes for the remaining two categories are shown in Table 
20. The expected values for the corresponding cells of 
Table 20 are shown in Table 21. A chi-square test was run 
using this data, with the chi-square value being 31.7, with 
two degrees of freedom. This is significant well beyond 
the .001 level of confidence. Comparing Tables 20 and 21, 
note that the relatively large chi-square value is primarily 
a function of the place and show classes, and not the win 
class. The variability for group members is significantly 
lower than that for individuals who attended alone. The 
average amount bet for the win, place, and show classes, for 
the two categories, is shown in Table 22. The relationship 
is as hypothesized. 
In general, the tests taken together offer strong sup¬ 
port for this hypothesis, but with the reservation that, ap¬ 
parently, the reduced variability among group members is not 
universal. 
- 
Win Place Show Totals 
Family 1051 492 244 1789 
Informal 
Group 664 283 146 1093 
Totals 1715 775 390 2880 
Table 19. Total Dollars Wagered under Win, 
Place, and Show Classes for 
Family and Informal Group 
Categories. 
I 
Alone 
Family plus 
Informal Group 
Totals 
Table 20. 
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W7in Place Show Totals 
1715 775 390. 2880 
1018 555 150 1723 
2733 1330 540 4603 
Total Dollars Wagered under Win, 
Place, and Show Classes for Alone 
and Family plus Informal Group 
Categories. 
I 
108 
- 
Win Place Show Totals 
Alone 1711 831 338- 2880 
Family plus 
Informal Group 1022 499 202 1723 
Totals 2733 1330 540 4603 
Table 21. Expected Total Dollars Wagered under 
Win, Place, and Show Classes for 
Alone and Family plus Informal Group 
Categories. 
I 
Alone 
Family plus 
Informal Group 
Table 22. 
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Win Place Show 
6.97 5.78 3.94 
3.62 3.97 3.97 
Average Amount, in Dollars, Wagered 
in Win, Place, and Show Classes for 
Alone and Family plus Informal 
Group Categories. 
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Footnotes 
The raw data for both the variability and the confi¬ 
dence hypotheses are available from the author at a small 
cost. 
2 
McGlothlin, "Stability of Choices Among Uncertain 
Alternatives," p. 613. 
3 
A personal statement by Mrs. Rosalind Muller, Director 
of Publicity at Green Mountain Race Track, Pownal, Vermont. 
She is familiar with many race fans, and can greet them on a 
personal basis. * 
4 
Scott, The Racing Game, p. 92. 
5 
Sidney Siegel, Nonparametric Statistics for the Be- 
havioral Sciences (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 
1956) . 
^Arthur S. Goldberger, Econometric Theory (New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964), Chapter 4. 
CHAPTER V 
RESULTS OF THE CONFIDENCE HYPOTHESES 
In this chapter, results of the three confidence hy¬ 
potheses are presented. Because of certain methodological 
problems, several extra tests appear under the discussion 
of the first hypothesis. These extra tests actually test 
components of more than one hypothesis at the same time. 
Other than this one exception, the hypotheses are discussed 
separately, with the interrelationships which exist between 
them being discussed in the Summary and Conclusions chapter. 
Discussion of H^ 
H^ Relative to Pre-Bet conditions, confidence in 
winning is higher under Post-Time conditions 
and higher yet under Post-Bet conditions. 
Knox and Inkster, as was previously reported, found that 
the level of confidence increased significantly from thirty 
seconds prior to the placement of the wager to thirty seconds 
subsequent to the placement of the wager. This finding sub¬ 
stantiated predictions based upon the theory of cognitive 
dissonance, and also provided the first clear-cut evidence 
that the dissonance reduction process can take place very 
rapidly. As was conjectured in Chapter II, it is expected 
I 
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that the dissonance reduction process remains in effect until 
the race is run, and that confidence in winning will be high¬ 
er at that time than it was just before the bet was placed, 
but that additional time and information will help mitigate 
this effect, to the degree that the level of confidence will 
be lower than that found immediately following the placement 
of the bet. 
This hypothesis provides a direct replication of the 
Knox and Inkster findings, and will, in addition, test the 
conjecture presented above. 
The level of confidence, as expressed by individuals, 
was recorded for Pre-Bet, Post-Bet and Post-Time conditions 
by four experimenters. This data was used to test this hy¬ 
pothesis. 
Since four different experimenters were used, it was 
first necessary to test the data for compatibility. A 
Kurskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance was run for the 
Pre-Bet data. The value of H, which is distributed as chi- 
square with, in this case, three degrees of freedom, was 
5.76, which is significant at the .125 level of confidence. 
As a consequence, the Pre-Bet data was combined into a 
single sample. A Kruskal-Wallis test was also run on the 
Post-Bet data. The value for H was 135.0, which is signif¬ 
icant well beyond the .001 level of confidence. This data 
could not be combined into a single sample. Particular 
care had been exercised to prevent this problem, but the 
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large value of H in the above test indicates that the prob¬ 
lem is a major one. This problem is considered in more de¬ 
tail in a later section of this chapter. As a consequence, 
instead of testing the combined data, it was necessary to 
use each experimenter's data by itself, and conduct tests 
for each of these sets of data. 
In the following discussion, for the sake of conveni¬ 
ence, each experimenter is referred to by her first name. 
The average level of confidence, as measured by each exper¬ 
imenter for all three conditions, was computed and is shown 
in Table 23. The twenty centimeter confidence scale was 
read by a number scale running from 0 to 200, and the re¬ 
ported averages are a function of this scale. 
It should be noted that the Post-Time averages are based 
on only a few observations. The number of observations for 
all three conditions for each experimenter are shown in 
Table 24. By looking at Table 23, the reason for the sig¬ 
nificant difference in the Post-Bet Kruskal-Wallis test is 
now evident, with Margie's average being much higher than 
expected. 
Mann-Whitney U tests were run between each pair of con¬ 
ditions for each experimenter. The Z-scores and the corres¬ 
ponding levels of confidence for each of these tests are 
shown in Tables 25, 26, and 27. 
For the Pre-Bet to Post-Bet comparison (Table 24), it 
- 
Pre-Bet Post-Bet Post-Time 
Candy 109 106 152 
Kathy 106 103 122 
Margie . 126 138 145 
Paula 77 108 24 
Table 23. Average Level of Confidence in 
Winning under Pre-Bet, Post-Bet, 
and Post-Time Conditions as re¬ 
recorded by Four Experimenters. 
The Confidence Scale runs from 
0 to 200. 
Pre-Bet Post-Bet Post-Time 
Candy 27 27 8 
Kathy 28 31 7 
Margie • 38 27 5 
Paula 22 31 3 
Table 24. Number of Individuals Interviewed 
under Pre-Bet, Post-Bet, and Post 
Time Conditions for Four Experi¬ 
menters . 
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* 
Candy Kathy Margie Paula 
Z-score .276 .433 1.452 . 1.550 
Confidence 
Level .392 .332 .073 .061 
Table 25. Z-Scores and Confidence Levels for 
Mann-Whitney U Tests of Confidence 
in Winning Between Pre-Bet and Post- 
Bet Conditions for Four Experimenters. 
Candy Kathy Margie Paula 
Z-score 1.49 413 265 .630 
Confidence 
Level .068 340 396 .264 
Table 26. Z-Scores and Confidence Levels for 
Mann-Whitney U Tests of Changes in 
the Confidence in Winning Between 
Pre-Bet and Post-Time Conditions 
for Four Experimenters. 
Candy Kathy Margie Paula 
Z-score 2.06 .716 
Confidence 
Level .020 .237 
.259 2.00 
.397 .023 
Table 27. Z-Scores and Confidence Levels for 
Mann-Whitney U Tests of Changes in 
the Confidence in Winning Between 
Post-Bet and Post-Time Conditions 
for Four Experimenters. 
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is apparent that no difference exists between the two condi¬ 
tions for any of the four experimenters. Two Z-scores, how¬ 
ever, those for Margie and Paula, are relatively high, and 
give reason to suspect a meaningful difference. Note, how¬ 
ever, that Margie's Pre-Bet average is higher than her 
Post-Bet average, while Paula's Pre-Bet average is lower 
o 
than her Post-Bet average, this being in apparent conflict. 
In view of the above statistical analysis, there is 
little cause to question the conclusion that no apparent dif¬ 
ference exists between the Pre-Bet and Post-Bet conditions, 
and that this portion of the current hypothesis is discon- 
firmed. Note that this analysis also fails to confirm the. 
Knox and Inkster findings. 
Considering the Pre-Bet to Post-Time comparisons (Table 
26), note that three of the four Z-scores are relatively low 
and indicate no apparent difference between these conditions 
for the corresponding experimenters. The fourth Z-score, 
that for Candy, is relatively high, but not significantly 
so. Recall, however, that the sample sizes for the Post- 
Time data may be small enough to make some of these compari¬ 
sons tenuous. In view of the above analysis, no difference 
in the Pre-Bet to Post-Time conditions is evident, and this 
portion of the present hypothesis is also deemed discon- 
firmed. . 
Considering the Post-Bet to Post-Time comparisons (Table 
I 
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27), note that two out of four Z-scores are large enough to 
indicate a significant difference between the tv/o conditions. 
But note, in Table 23, that Candy's Post-Time average is 
higher than the Post-Bet average, while Paula's is just the 
opposite. This offers conflicting evidence, in that the two 
significant Z-scores are a function of opposite directional¬ 
ity. The overall analysis shows that no apparent difference 
exists between the Post-Time and Post-Bet conditions, and 
this portion of the current hypothesis is also disconfirmed. 
Incomoatibilitv of Subsamples 
. - - r . ■ -- ■ r — 
Recall that the Kruskal-V.’allis test for the Post-Bet 
data indicated that this data was not compatible among the 
four experimenters. An investigation of this problem, with 
direct reference to the Knox and Inkster study, appears in 
this section. 
In the Knox and Inkster study, the data for the two ex¬ 
perimenters was tested for compatibility using the Kolmogorov 
Smirnov one-sample test. The chi-square value for the Pre- 
Bet condition for that study was .274, with two degrees of 
freedom, which was significant at the .80 level of confidence 
The chi-square value for the Post-Bet data was 3.14, with two 
degrees of freedom, which was significant at the .21 level of 
confidence. 
In an attempt to parallel their work, the Kolmogorov- 
Smirnov test was run for all pairs of experimenters in this 
I 
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study. The chi-square values and the corresponding levels 
of confidence for the Pre-Bet and Post-Bet tests are shown 
in Tables 28 and 29. 
Note that, for these twelve tests, data for only two 
pairs are not compatible, although two other chi-square val¬ 
ues fall within the .10 warning limits. Using this fact, 
one finds that the probability of choosing a single pair of 
experimenters, as was done in the Knox and Inkster study, 
and finding compatible data, is .667. It is, therefore, 
possible that the data derived for the four experimenters 
of this study is as compatible, or perhaps even more so, 
than that for the Knox and Inkster experimenters. 
Knox and Inkster used a median test (not the most power¬ 
ful) to show that a shift, in an upward direction, took place 
between the Pre-Bet and Post-Bet conditions. Although the 
work is not shown in this paper, median tests were run for 
all pairs of experimenters of this study, whether their data 
was compatible or not. All six showed, without a doubt, 
that no difference exists between the Pre-Bet and Post-Bet 
conditions, with the smallest level of confidence being .25, 
and the next smallest being .46. 
Further Analysis 
Recall that the prior analysis failed to confirm a sig¬ 
nificant increase in confidence between the Pre-Bet and Post- 
Bet conditions. Another hypothesis (H0) is discussed in the 
Chi-Square 
Value 
Confidence 
Level 
Paula and Margie 6.07 . 049 
Kathy and Paula 1.67 .47 • 
Paula and Candy 3. 40 .18 
Kathy and Margie 1.15 .50 
Margie and Candy 3.14 .21 
Kathy and Candy .539 .75 
Table 28. Chi-Square Values and Confidence 
Levels for Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Tests for Pre-Bet Data for Six 
Pairs of Experimenters. 
I 
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Chi-Square 
Value 
Confidence 
Level 
Paula and Margie 4.82 .09 
Kathy and Paula 1.03 .60 
Paula and Candy .931 .63 
Kathy and Margie 5.03 .075 
Margie and Candy 5.99 . 05 
Kathy and Candy 1.95 . 39 
Table 29. Chi-Square Values and Confidence 
Levels for Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Tests for Post-Bet Data for Six 
Pairs of Experimenters. 
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next section of this - chapter. The data used for testing 
that hypothesis is the same as that used for the current hy¬ 
pothesis, only it is subdivided into several subsamples. 
Two of these subsamples are: (1) individuals who had won 
their previous race and were winning overall (the so-called 
WW condition), and (2) individuals who had lost their previ- 
ous race and were losing overall (the so-called LL condi¬ 
tion) . Since the Pre-Bet data was already broken down for 
that hypothesis, the Post-Bet data was also broken down. 
Mann-Whitney U tests were run for both the WW and LL condi¬ 
tions, for each of the four experimenters. The Z-scores and 
the corresponding levels of confidence for these tests are 
shown in Tables 30 and 31. 
Examination of these two tables show that seven out of 
eight tests indicate no significant difference between the 
Pre-Bet and Post-Bet conditions, reconfirming the results 
found earlier. The eighth test result is surprising, not be¬ 
cause it indicates a significant difference, but because it 
indicates a shift in the direction opposite that expected. 
For Candy, under the WW condition, the Pre-Bet average was 
161.0, while the Post-Bet average was 131.0. If this re¬ 
ported shift to a lower Post-Bet average confidence in win¬ 
ning actually exists, as the above test indicates, not only 
would the current hypothesis and the Knox and Inkster find¬ 
ings be disconfirmed, but this would be the first time, to 
Z-Score Confidence 
Value Level 
Candy .916 .18 
Margie .249 .40 
Paula .318 .37 
Kathy .335 .36 • 
Table 30. Z-Score Values and Confidence Level 
for Mann-Whitney U Tests for LL Con 
ditions for Four Experimenters. 
126 
Candy 
Z-Score Confidence 
• 
Value Level 
1.796 • .036 
Margie .088 .468 
Paula .143* 
Kathy 1.220 .111 
Table 31. Z-Score Values and Confidence Levels 
for Mann-Whitney U Tests for WW Con¬ 
ditions for Four Experimenters. 
* 
Obtained from Table J in Non-Parametric Statistics 
by Siegel. 
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the best of the writer's knowledge, that the existence of 
the underlying dissonance reduction process has been discon- 
firmed by experimental findings. 
Since the Knox and Inkster study used a pair of experi¬ 
menters to show the upwards shift in level of confidence be¬ 
tween the Pre-Bet and Post-Bet conditions, data for pairs of 
experimenters of this study were analyzed in the same way. 
It was found that, for the Candy and Kathy combination, under 
WW conditions alone, that the average Pre-Bet confidence 
score was 178.0, while the average Post-Bet score was 124.0. 
A Mann-Whitney U test was run using this data, the Z-score 
being 1.89, with one degree of freedom, which is significant 
beyond the .03 level of confidence. This analysis shows that, 
when a more detailed study is performed, additional factors 
become relevant, which can override the conclusions drawn from 
the more general study. This is apparently the case with the 
current analysis, where the results of the detailed study 
conflict with those of the more general study. 
Considering all of the evidence in this section, it is 
apparent that this hypothesis, nor any part of it, can be 
confirmed. 
Discussion of Hg 
H0 Relative to those who lost their previous race or 
o 
are financially below the break-even point, con- 
I 
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fidence in winning is higher for those who won 
their previous race or who are financially 
breaking even for the racing program. 
This hypothesis is tested using the data generated un¬ 
der the previous hypothesis. The individual responses, for 
the Pre-Bet data only, were grouped under the following four 
classifications: (1) those who won their previous race and 
are winning over the racing program (hereafter referred to 
as WW), (2) those who won their previous race and are losing 
over the racing program (hereafter referred to as WL), (3) 
those who lost their previous race but are winning over the 
racing program (hereafter referred to as LW), and (4) those 
who lost their previous race and are losing over the racing 
program (hereafter referred to as LL). 
Recall that the Pre-Bet data was compatible for all four 
experimenters. In view of this, the Pre-Bet data, for all 
four experimenters and under all four of the above classifi¬ 
cations, was tested with the Kruskal-Wallis test. The chi- 
square values and the corresponding levels of confidence for 
these tests are shown in Table 32. The data is compatible 
for all four classifications and was consequently grouped 
into four subsamples, one for each classification. 
Mann-Whitney U tests were run for each of the four 
classifications. The Z-scores and the corresponding level 
of confidence for these tests are shown in Table 33. The 
WL 
W W 
lw 
LL 
Table 
Chi-Square Confidence 
Value Level 
1.10 
1.93 
.67 
.00 
.60 
. 35 
.73 
1.00 
32. Chi-Square Values and Confidence 
Levels for Kruskal-Wallis Tests 
of Pre-Bet Data for WW, WL, LW, 
and LL Classifications. 
Z-Score 
Value 
Confidence 
Level 
WW-LL 
VJW-WL 
WW-LW 
LL-WL 
LL-LW 
WL-LW 
2.83 
1.65 
. 79 
1.6 3 
2.00 
.26 
.002 
.052 
.215 
. 051 
. 023 
. 390 
Table 33. Z-Score Values and Confidence Levels 
for Mann-Whitney U Tests Between Six 
Pairs of Classifications. 
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average score for each of the four classifications is shown 
in Table 34. 
Inspection of Tables 33 and 34 indicates that the level 
of confidence in winning for the LL classification is sig¬ 
nificantly lower than any other classification, and that the 
WW level of confidence in winning is significantly higher 
than WL, and higher, but not significantly so, than LW. LW 
is higher, but not significantly higher than WL. These are 
precisely the relationships expected under this hypothesis, 
and, as a consequence, this hypothesis is considered con¬ 
firmed. 
Discussion of 
Relative to losers of both their previous race and 
the entire racing program, the increase in confi¬ 
dence in winning between Pre-Bet and Post-Bet con¬ 
ditions is greater for those individuals who won 
their previous race or who are winning over the 
entire racing program. 
Note that this hypothesis presupposes that an increase 
in confidence in winning takes place between the Pre-Bet and 
Post-Bet conditions. This was not confirmed by the previous 
work. Indeed, there was some evidence that the reverse 
shift in the level of confidence in winning took place. In 
view of this finding, the present hypothesis is not meaning¬ 
ful, and, as a consequence, was not tested. 
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WW LW WL LL 
Average 
Score 
149.0 120.0 118.9 77.5 
Table 34. Average Confidence in Winning Score 
for WW, WL, LW, and LL Classifica¬ 
tions . 
I 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Utility theory can, historically, be thought of as hav¬ 
ing evolved in three distinct phases. These phases are de¬ 
lineated by the popularity of three different utility models, 
the classical cardinal model, the neoclassical ordinal model, 
and the modern Von Neumann-Morgenstern model. These were 
discussed in detail in Chapter I. 
Originally, economic theory was primarily descriptive. 
Consequently, the classical utility model was primarily used 
as a descriptive tool, serving to explain the rationality 
behind the exchange of goods. Gradually, the classical model 
was replaced by the neoclassical ordinal utility model, which 
could explain this rationality equally well as the classical 
model, but was easier to justify because it required fewer 
underlying assumptions. 
As economic theory became more sophisticated, it became 
predictive as well as descriptive. The ordinal model is 
still widely used as both a descriptive and predictive tool. 
Economics, and the relatively new field of management 
science, have now branched heavily into the area of decision¬ 
making. Paralleling this transition into decision-making 
was the widespread acceptance of the Von Neumann-Morgenstern 
utility model, which is essentially a hybrid of the cardinal 
and ordinal models and facilitates the solution of problems 
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involving risk. The old ordinal model is not adaptable to 
decision-making because it makes no provision for incorpor¬ 
ating methodology to handle risk, which is an attribute of 
the decision-making process. 
As the management sciences mature, certain techniques, 
primarily Bayesian decision-making and game theory, are be¬ 
coming increasingly dependent upon utility theory. This de¬ 
pendency comes in the form of the need for a measurable util¬ 
ity index. Presently, a viable and practical methodology for 
the measurement of utility is lacking. 
In recent years there have been some attempts to measure 
utility using the experimental approach. Although relatively 
few of these experiments have been attempted, even fewer have 
met with notable success. The major problem associated with 
this approach is the confounding of the measurement of the 
utility of tangible goods with the utility of intangible 
attributes of these goods and, in particular, the utility 
associated with the risk which underlies the entire decision¬ 
making process. This is the so-called utility of gambling. 
At present, no attempts have been made to control or measure 
the utility of gambling. This constitutes the purpose of 
this work. 
The stated purpose of this research is to investigate, 
isolate, and provide some measurement of the behavioral at¬ 
tributes which underlie the gambling process. The study is 
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investigatory in nature, and focuses primarily on two of 
these variables, the variability of the individual and his 
confidence in winning. Variability is the potential upward 
change in asset position resulting from participation in the 
gamble, and was carefully defined in Chapter II. Variabili¬ 
ty can be increased by either increasing the amount wagered 
or by choosing gambles which render a lower probability of 
success, and therefore higher payoffs. 
These two variables, confidence in winning and varia¬ 
bility, were tested in a real world setting, a horse race 
track. The experimental models were patterned after viable 
behavioral models, tested behavioral theory, and conjectures 
and observations resulting from previous experimentation. 
This research was described in Chapter I. 
The specific hypotheses relate the above mentioned var¬ 
iables to other variables, and attempt to explain relation¬ 
ships which appear to exist between them. These other var¬ 
iables include: (1) time, (2) patterns of prior successes 
or failures, (3) individual experience in the gambling pro¬ 
cess, (4) satisfaction with the gambling process and its out 
comes, and (5) presence of group pressures. 
Two types of hypotheses are tested, the variability hy¬ 
potheses, which test relationships which exist between indi¬ 
vidual variability and other variables, and the confidence 
hypotheses, which test relationships which exist between con 
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fidence in v/inning and other variables. Two separate exper¬ 
imental processes, an aggregate empirical investigation and 
a personal survey, were conducted, simultaneously, to gather 
the data needed to test the variability hypotheses. A sub¬ 
sequent, and independent, personal interview was used as the 
experimental basis for testing the confidence hypotheses. 
The major conclusions were as follows: 
(1) In the aggregate bettors increase the amount bet 
(not corrected for attendance changes) as the 
race program progresses. 
(2) In the aggregate, bettors increase the proportion 
of win tickets purchased (tickets with a rela¬ 
tively low probability of success), slightly de¬ 
crease the proportion of place tickets purchased 
(tickets with an intermediate probability of suc¬ 
cess) , and decrease the proportion of show tickets 
purchased (tickets with relatively high probabil¬ 
ity of success). 
(3) Clubhouse bettors (an important, but biased, seg¬ 
ment of the total population) increase the amount 
wagered (corrected for attendance changes) as the 
racing program progresses. 
Clubhouse bettors start their evening by betting, 
on the average, a higher proportion of win money, 
then decrease this proportion as the race card 
(4) 
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progresses. The proportion of place money wagered 
increases as the race card progresses, while the . . 
proportion of show money wagered decreases. 
(5) The increase in the amount wagered varies as the 
pattern of prior overall and immediate successes 
changes. In general, winners of their previous 
race increase the amount of money wagered more 
than do losers. Losers who remained below the' 
break-even point increase the amount wagered more 
than do losers who remained above the break-even 
point, and these individuals, in turn, increase 
the amount wagered more than do individuals who 
lost their previous race and fell through the 
break-even point simultaneously. 
(6) Losers who remained below the break-even point in¬ 
creased the proportion of tickets purchased which 
have a lower probability of success more than did 
losers who remained above the break-even point. 
These individuals, in turn, increased this pro¬ 
portion more than did individuals who lost their 
previous race and fell through the break-even 
point simultaneously. Winners of their previous 
race increase the purchase of these tickets less 
than any of the three other groups. 
(7) Individuals who are losing prior to their last 
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wager bet in such a manner that they will at 
least break even for the evening if they win. 
(8) Individuals who are veteran race fans bet a slight¬ 
ly lower proportion of races attended than do new¬ 
comers. 
(9) The amount of money won is a major factor in ex¬ 
plaining the degree of satisfaction derived from 
the racing program as a whole. The percent of' 
tickets collected is an unimportant factor. Other 
variables account for most of the variation in the 
degree of satisfaction. 
(10) Individuals who attend the races as members of in¬ 
formal groups or with members of their families, 
increase the amount wagered over the racing program 
less than do individuals who attend alone. 
(11) Group members increase the proportion of tickets 
which yield a lower probability of success at a 
lower rate than do individuals who attend alone. 
(12) Confidence in winning does not change significantly 
from the time the decision is made to the time the 
race gets underway. 
(13) Confidence in winning, when measured before the 
wager is made, is greater for individuals who won 
f * 
their previous race and are winning overall, is 
slightly lower for those who lost their last race 
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but are still winning overall, lower yet for 
winners of their previous race who are losing 
overall, and lowest for those who lost their 
previous race and are losing overall. 
Observations on the Design and Execution 
of the Experiment 
The execution of the experimentation of this study must 
be considered successful. No problems were encountered in 
the aggregate empirical investigation. 
For the individual investigation, the small crowds pres¬ 
ent in the Clubhouse on week nights late in the racing season 
restricted the sample size and necessitated the collection of 
data over a three night period. The track officials would 
not allow data collection on the weekend, when crowds were 
large. Over the three night period, approximately 2500 indi¬ 
viduals entered the Clubhouse area. An estimated 2100 of 
these received the flyer handout. Of these, 476 individuals 
voluntarily picked up a data booklet. Of the 476 booklets 
given out, 124 were returned and 78 more were picked up after 
the crowds had departed. Only 121 of these were usable, some 
of them containing only partial information. 
Interestingly, over 50 percent of the booklets simply 
disappeared. After searching trash receptacles and the bet¬ 
ting areas, 274 booklets were not located. Apparently some 
individuals used them for personal record keeping and took 
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them home purposely,• while others simply forgot they had 
them and simply walked off with them. 
Only two problems were encountered in the confidence 
investigation. Steps had been taken to assure a uniform in¬ 
terviewing process, yet, apparently, personal attributes of 
the experimenters resulted in the Post-Bet data being incom- 
patible. 
For the Pre-Bet and Post-Bet conditions, approximately 
70 percent of the individuals approached participated in the 
experiment, the rest preferring not to comment on their bet¬ 
ting behavior or betting success. It was suspected that some 
individuals were hesitant to interact with the experimenters, 
they being college students and coeds. Interestingly, under 
the Post-Time condition, it was difficult to find individuals 
who had placed their bets early enough to return to the stand¬ 
ing area in time for an interview and, of those who did, many 
seemed impatient and were unwilling to complete an interview 
after starting it. The reason for this is unexplained. 
Observations on the Results of the Study 
Some of the hypotheses were easily confirmed while others 
were not. Two of them were either not tested or were inade¬ 
quately tested. The last hypothesis was not meaningful in 
view of previous results and was not tested. For another hy¬ 
pothesis, the sample was heavily biased and forced testing 
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with a very small sample size, with the results being not 
very meaningful. If the experiment had been executed earli¬ 
er in the racing season, this problem would not have oc¬ 
curred 
It would have been preferable to define the two compo¬ 
nents of variability, the amount wagered component and the 
probability component, as separate variables. In several 
cases, the aggregate individual behavior for these two com¬ 
ponents did not agree. Hypotheses based on these two com¬ 
ponents defined as separate variables would have been easier 
to either confirm or disconfirm. 
In general, the results indicated that, by performing 
the more detailed analysis, and by breaking down the sample 
into subsamples for analysis, many different patterns of in¬ 
dividual behavior were evident. There appear to be too many 
different patterns to make an exhaustive study tenable. The 
relatively high degree of detail included in the current 
study is probably the major factor for failure to confirm or 
only partially confirm the results of previous studies. 
This, of course, indicates a weakness in the experimental de¬ 
signs of those studies. 
Given the variety of individual behavior apparent in the 
investigation of just these two variables, and considering 
the probable number of variables which underlie the gambling 
process, it is apparent that the current work has barely 
I 
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started to explain or measure the factors which contribute 
to the utility of gambling, although it represents a step in 
the right direction. 
Possible Future Experimentation 
It is this writer's opinion that a logical extension of 
this work would involve a carefully designed and tightly 
controlled laboratory type experiment. The current work 
would serve as a valuable aid in the design of such an in¬ 
vestigation . 
A cardinal rule at the race track is that the privacy 
of the individual race fan should not be disrupted. This 
rule greatly influenced the design and affected the results 
of the current study. Before any contact with individuals 
was allowed, permission to conduct the experiments was neces¬ 
sarily granted by the Vermont Racing Commission. This per¬ 
mission was obtained through efforts of track management. 
Management, of course, held veto power over the types of per¬ 
sonal contact allowed. Experimenters were met and briefed 
by track security personnel and execution was often conducted 
in accord with suggestions made by track personnel. The in¬ 
terviewing process and personal contact methodology was pre¬ 
approved by track management and was strictly adhered to at 
all times. The entire experimental process was conducted as 
if it were rigidly controlled by track management, although, 
I 
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during actual execution, this was not the case. 
As a consequence, individual participation in the ex¬ 
perimental process was strictly voluntary, with provision 
made to allow contact to be easily broken by the individual 
at any time. In many cases this led to partially completed 
data booklets and partially completed interviews. It also, 
of course, led to a highly biased sample. The purpose of 
the controlled laboratory type experiment is to circumvent 
this problem. 
The experiment would not be carried out in a laboratory 
atmosphere, but in a natural gambling setting, which could 
be controlled by the experimenters. It would be necessary 
to ask for and expect complete data responses from all indi¬ 
vidual subjects. The sample could be pre-selected, which 
would eliminate bias. Most importantly, experimenters would 
have time to complete interviews and conduct more complex 
ones. The pace of the experimental process could be con¬ 
trolled, instead of being subject to extraneous control as 
was the present experiment. Such an experiment is feasible. 
Using this more complete and detailed record of betting 
behavior, the hypotheses of the current study could be repli¬ 
cated and the results confirmed once again. Complete records 
would be useful for further tests, with new hypotheses being 
concerned with information seeking and information compre¬ 
hension, and with the learning process which underlies this 
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behavior. 
Finally, the controlled experiment could provide the 
basis for a comparison of real world studies and laboratory 
type experiments, a relationship which needs to be validated. 
» 
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APPENDIX A 
A GUARANTEED WINNER AT THE TRACK? 
YES! Several years ago Dr. William H. McGlothlin of 
the Rand Corporation analyzed nearly 10,000 thoroughbred 
horse races. Although his findings never appeared before 
the general public, he discovered several ways in which the 
average bettor could improve his betting style. He also 
found one betting situation, which occurs once during every 
racing program, in which the public bets very poorly. If 
one is aware of this situation and wishes to take advantage 
of his knowledge, over the long run he is GUARANTEED TO WIN 
MONEY! 
Tonight, a research team from the University of Massa¬ 
chusetts is conducting a second study of individual betting 
behavior. Many racing fans who are attending tonight's 
races are participating in this study by submitting records 
of the bets they place during the evening. We are asking 
you to join them. 
Just inside the Clubhouse entrance is a table marked 
"University of Massachusetts." Here you may pick up a small 
booklet in which you may record your evening's wagers as you 
make them. For your convenience, the booklet also provides 
a place for you to make a record of your winnings and losses 
for tonicht's program. 
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As you leave the Clubhouse, you may exchange the com¬ 
pleted booklet for a detailed summary of the McGlothlin 
study. We believe that you will find this summary of inter¬ 
est. IT MAY IMPROVE YOUR CHANCES OF WINNING MONEY IN THE 
FUTURE! This report is offered as a reward for your partic¬ 
ipation in tonight's study. 
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APPENDIX B 
THE MCGLOTHLIN STUDY—A SUMMARY 
The following report is based on the article "Stability 
of Choices Among Uncertain Alternatives" by William H. Mc- 
Glothlin of the Rand Corporation, which appeared in the 
American Journal of Psychology, Volume 68 (1955), pp. 604-615. 
This effort was a statistical study of 9,605 thoroughbred 
horse races run in New York and California between 1947 and 
1953. Its primary purpose was to examine the stability of 
risk-taking behavior over a series of events. The study re¬ 
vealed that, essentially, three patterns of betting behavior 
appeared during the course of each racing program. One com¬ 
mon pattern occurred during the first six races, another 
pattern appeared during the feature race, and a third ap¬ 
peared during the last race. A description and an interpre¬ 
tation of these patterns follows. 
The First Six Races 
Considering the first six races only, the results showed 
that, over the six year period cited, the betting public was 
able to accurately assess the chances of winning for horses 
whose final odds fell in the 3.5/1 to 5.5/1 interval. They 
overbet (bet too much) horses whose odds exceeded 5.5/1 and 
underbet (did not bet enough) horses odded at 3/1 or less. 
In general, scientific research has established that people 
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tend to over-estimate the probability of success of an event 
when the true probability is low and under-estimate it when 
the true probability is high. Converting probabilities into 
odds, the conclusion is that people over-estimate the chances 
of long shots and under-estimate the chances of favorites. 
The Feature Race 
Most of the data used in this study came from tracks 
which normally include eight races in each racing program. 
The seventh race is the feature race. For this race only, 
the betting public was able to correctly assess the true 
chances of winning for horses odded at 3/1 or less. It was 
noted that these horses were given considerable publicity, 
especially in the newspapers, since they were contenders for 
the feature race. The public, utilizing this information, 
was able to handicap these horses accurately. For unex¬ 
plained reasons, the public overbet horses odded at 20/1 or 
more, and underbet horses odded between 3/1 and 20/1. They 
especially underbet horses odded around 7/1. 
The Last Race 
It was suspected that many individuals were losing be¬ 
tween seven and ten dollars after the first seven races. 
Betting behavior in the last race reflected this apparent 
loss. Bettors tended to bet in such a manner as to enable 
them to break even for the evening if they collected their 
final bet. Consequently, the public overbet horses odded in 
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the 3.5/1 to 5/1 interval, since the payoffs for these horses 
would earn from seven to ten dollars. The public underbet 
horses with higher odds and grossly underbet horses odded at 
2/1 or less. 
What Do the Preceeding Results Mean? 
The manner in which the public assesses the chances that 
a given horse will win in no way affects the true probability 
that he might win. If, however, an individual holds a win¬ 
ning ticket on a horse which was underbet by the public, he 
is better off, since the payoff will be higher than normal. 
Specifically, this means that, if people were to give addi¬ 
tional attention to horses falling in the underbet categories, 
they would, in the long run, collect higher payoffs. If they 
were to bet horses which were overbet by the public, their 
payoffs would be smaller than normal. Thus, during the 
first six races, individuals should consider low odded horses 
since, in general, horses odded at 3/1 or less are underbet. 
For races in which a few horses have received considerable 
publicity (as in the feature race), they should consider 
horses in the middle range, especially horses odded around 
7/1. During the last race they should consider horses odded 
at 2/1 or less. 
This last statement is the basis for the statement 
"GUARANTEED TO WIN" which appeared in the flyer distributed 
earlier. Statistical analysis reveals that, over the six 
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year period, if one bet only horses odded at 2/1 or less in 
the last race, he would have made money, since the public .so 
poorly bets this category that the payoffs received more 
than offset the track take. 
The McGlothlin results include additional information 
concerning individual betting behavior. These may be of in¬ 
terest to the reader, and are listed below. 
(1) The average amount bet by an individual’during a 
single racing program is nearly 10 percent higher near the 
end of the racing season than near its beginning. 
(2) Amounts bet increase as the racing program progresses. 
On the average, nearly 80 percent more money is bet on the 
feature race than is bet on the first race. Late arrivals 
partially account for this. 
(3) As the racing program progresses, the proportion of 
win tickets purchased increases steadily, the proportion of 
place tickets declines somewhat, while the proportion of 
show tickets declines rapidly. 
(4) Bettors tend to increase the amount they bet more 
after having lost their previous race than after having won 
their previous wager. 
I 
APPENDIX C 
DATA BOOKLET 
Page 1 
If you wish to receive a copy of the results of this 
study, please fill in the following form. The results 
will be mailed to you upon completion of the analysis. 
This page will be removed prior to data analysis and there 
will be no way to connect your name to the recorded infor¬ 
mation. 
Name 
Street Address _ 
City _State__Zip 
Page 2 
Please check the following: 
Previous to this evening, have you attended the races, 
during your lifetime:_less than 3 times? 
_between 3 and 15 times? _more than 15 times? 
Are you attending the track: _with your family? 
_alone? _as a member of a group? 
Your family's yearly income is: _below $5,000 
_between $5,000 and $10,000 _over $10,000. 
Your occupation is  
Age_Sex_Marital Status__ 
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Page 5 
Daily Double 
Combination of 
Horses Bet 
Amount 
Spent 
Amount 
Collected 
Totals 
Amount Won Amount Lost 
Page 6 
1st Race 
Number of 
Horse 
Type of 
Bet 
Amount 
Spent 
Amount 
Collected 
Odds Showing at 
Time of Decision 
Totals 
Amount Lost Amount Won 
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Page 10 
"Big P" Betting 
Total Amount Bet 
Total Amount Collected 
Amount Won Amount Lost 
Page 15 
9th Race Perfecta Betting 
Combination of 
Horses Bet 
Amount 
Spent 
Amount 
Collected 
Totals 
Amount Won Amount Lost 
Page 17 
Please record, on the scale shown below, your degree 
of satisfaction with this evening's racing entertainment. 
To record your level of satisfaction, draw a vertical line 
across the scale at the appropriate place. The greater 
your satisfaction, the further to the right your mark 
should appear. 
Dissatisfied Satisfied 
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